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ABSTRACT
As concerns about the negative impacts of sanctions on the human rights of civilians and the
environment increases, it is necessary to reflect upon the lawfulness and legal status of such
measures in international law, and their impact on business enterprises and the field of Business
and Human Rights (BHR). While current academic literature tends to focus on implementation,
enforcement and business compliance with unilateral and multilateral sanctions, the negative
impacts of sanctions on non-state actors and resulting human rights violations are overlooked.
Specifically, the relationship between sanctions law and the responsibility of businesses to respect
human rights and the duty of states to protect human rights as endorsed by BHR instruments such
as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) and OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises must be examined. This thesis investigates whether sanctions have
received any consideration in international BHR normative standards, including whether the state
duty to protect human rights as found in the UNGPs is relevant when a home state imposes
sanctions either on its own companies operating internationally, or on other TNCs, and whether a
corporation can comply with its own responsibility to respect human rights in light of the
imposition of sanctions. The thesis concludes with recommendations for policy considerations that
must be taken into account in the context of sanctions and BHR in order to fill the sanctions
governance gap in BHR guidance tools.
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Chapter I Introduction
1.1.

Problematique and Objectives

“Real concerns and serious political differences between governments must never be resolved by
precipitating economic and humanitarian disasters, making ordinary people pawns and hostages
thereof.”1

Maintaining international peace and security has always been a challenging issue
throughout history. Due to this, since the establishment of the United Nations (UN), the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) has attempted to address and to minimize these challenges by
taking various approaches. One of the tools applied by the UNSC to safeguard international peace
and security is the imposition of multilateral sanctions of a universally binding nature against
international actors that are engaging in threatening behaviour.2 In order to become a more
effective tool, this approach has evolved to some extent and what used to be practiced as
comprehensive sanctions regimes, has now turned into smart or targeted sanctions that usually
target a specific state, corporate entity, individual or even a region.3
But the UNSC is not the only body imposing sanctions.4 The European Union (EU) also
considers sanctions (or restrictive measures, as they call them), instruments of an economic or
diplomatic nature that should be used when certain policies or activities violate international law

1

United Nations Special Rapporteur on the negative impacts of the unilateral coercive measures, Mr. Idriss Jazairy.
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (6 May 2019) online:<
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24566&LangID=E>.
2
See Thomas J. Biersteker et al, “UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)” (2018) 55:3 J Peace Research 404.
3
See Clara Portela, "National Implementation of United Nations Sanctions" (2009) 65:1 Intl J 13.
4
The legitimacy, power and effectiveness of the United Nations is not equivalent to that of any other entity or
organizations. Thus, the UN traditionally has a special status based on UN Charter Articles 25 and 103 that require
member states to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. The role of the UN in sanctions law will
be explored in further detail in Chapter 1.
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or human rights, or do not respect the rule of law.5 The ability to impose regional sanctions either
autonomously or pursuant to the binding resolutions of the UNSC is set out by Article 11 of the
Treaty on European Union.6 The restrictive measures practiced by the EU may target states or nonstate actors and include a vast range of measures of an economic nature.
Another type of coercive measures that is highly disputed are called autonomous or
unilateral sanctions, and arise when a state uses or encourages the use of economic, political or
any other measures to coerce another state in order to “obtain from it the subordination of the
exercise of its sovereign rights”7. The UN General Assembly has adopted many resolutions which
condemn the use of unilateral coercive measures (UCM) and consider them to be contrary to
“international law, international humanitarian law, the Charter of the United Nations and the norms
and principles governing peaceful relations among state”8. Nevertheless, unilateral sanctions
continue to be imposed by powerful states, and a recent specific example of this practice is the
imposition by the United States (US) of unilateral sanctions against Iran.
There are many academic articles and books that discuss various aspects of sanctions law,
whether multilateral or unilateral sanctions.9 Nevertheless, despite the prominent economic aspect
5

European Commission, “Restrictive Measures” (Spring 2008) European External Action Service
online:<http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/cfsp/sanctions/docs/index_en.pdf> at 1. Also see Cristian DeFrancia,
"Enforcing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: The Legality of Preventive Measures" (2012)
45:3 Vand J Transnat'l L 705.
6
European Union, Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht, (7 February
1992), Official Journal of the European Communities C 325/5; 24 December 2002.
7
Matthew Happold, “Economic Sanctions and International Law: An Introduction” in Matthew Happold & Paul Eden
(eds), Economic Sanctions and International Law, 1ST ed (UK: Hart Publishing, 2016) at 4 para 2. also See
International Law Commission (ILC), “Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission on
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International
Law” (13 April 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006) 175–78.
8
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2014 [on the report of the Third Committee
(A/69/488/Add.2 and Corr.1)] 69/180. Human Rights and Unilateral Coercive Measures, UN Doc A/RES/69/180.
9
For example, see Susan Hannah Allen & David J Lektzian. “Economic Sanctions: A Blunt Instrument?” (2013) 50:1
J Peace Research 121; Ali Z Marossi et al. Economic Sanctions under International Law Unilateralism,
Multilateralism, Legitimacy, and Consequences (T.M.C. Asser Press: Imprint: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2015); Gary Clyde
Hufbauer et al, 3rd ed Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International
Economics, 2007); and Jeremy Matam Farrall & Kim Rubenstein, Sanctions, Accountability and Governance in a
Globalised World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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of coercive measures, an important concern that has rarely been examined is the impact of
sanctions on non-state actors. Specifically, what is the relationship between sanctions law and the
responsibility of businesses to respect human rights and the duty of states to protect human rights
as endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights (UNGPs)?10
This thesis will consider a number of related questions. What are the human rights duties
of states when dealing with business enterprises that are operating in or associated with a
sanctioned country? More specifically, what are the human rights duties of home states as
compared to host states in this context? Do Business and Human Rights (BHR) instruments (such
as the 2011 UNGPs, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD MNE
Guidelines)11 or the UN Global Compact12 ever provide guidance specific to the sanctions context?
And if so, how do they direct businesses and states (host state and home state) to perform with
regard to a sanctioned country or a sanctioned business entity? What is the content of the state duty
to protect human rights and business responsibility to respect human rights in the sanctions
context?
In order to answer these questions, the thesis engages in a detailed analysis of the state duty
to protect and the business responsibility to respect human rights, clarified by the Special
Representative to the United Nations Secretary General on Business and Human Rights (SRSG),
Mr. John Ruggie, as fundamental pillars of the UNGPs. Many scholars have argued that the state

10

John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issues of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UNHRC, 17 th Sess, UN Doc
A/HRC/17/31 (2011) [Guiding Principles].
11
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011), online:< https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf>.
12
United Nations Global Compact (2000), online:< https://www.unglobalcompact.org/>.
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duty to protect is not territorially limited.13 The core question then is whether, and if so, how, BHR
instruments have tried to mitigate or to limit the negative consequences of sanctions and their
unintended consequences on people and environment in sanctioned states,14 whether through the
state duty to protect rights or the business responsibility to respect human rights.15 Ruggie asserts
in his reports that the lack of respect for human rights mostly occurs in conflict-affected areas16. If
sanctions, as stated by many, are a form of war, an economic war,17 then perhaps special measures
must be taken along with elaborate due diligence processes, to reduce their detrimental impacts on
individuals and on the environment. How can international instruments identify possible
approaches and tools for home and host states of transnational corporations, as well as states
influenced by the sanctions, to reduce the risk of sanction‐related human rights abuses occurring
in such contexts?
In order to provide an example of the impact of sanctions on BHR, the case of Iran, one of
the most sanctioned countries, will be analyzed.18 Different types of sanctions have been imposed
on Iran over the past forty years. Due to this, many Transnational Corporations (TNCs) did not get

13

For example see Casajuna Artacho, “Extraterritorial Dimension of the State Duty to Protect Human Rights in
Relation to Business Activities” (Paper delivered at The Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business
and
Human
Rights
in
Spain,
Seville,
4-6
November
2013),
online:
<www.businesshumanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/extraterritorial-dimension-of-state-duty-protect-human-rightse-casajuna.pdf>; Markus Krajewski, “The State Duty to Protect Against Human Rights Violations Through
Transnational Business Activities” (2018) 23 Deakin L Rev 13 at 39; and Claire Methven O’brien, “The Home State
Duty to Regulate the Human Rights Impacts of TNCs Abroad: A Rebuttal” (2018) 3:1 Bus & Human Rts J 47. Also,
the Maastricht Principles address this issue in detail, see Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States
in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (2011) 29 Neth. Q. Human Rights 578.
14
Sina Khatami, “Environment: The Invisible Victim of Sanctions against Iran” (2014) Etemad Daily Newspaper,
No. 3115, at 13.
15
See United Nations Guiding Principles, supra note 10 at pillar one and two, also see Norms on the Responsibilities
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, 2003, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2.
16
See John Ruggie & Tamaryn Nelson, “Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises:
Normative Innovations and Implementation Challenges” (2015) 22:1 Brown J World Affairs 99.
17
Jack Kenny, “Sanctions: The Economic War on Iran” (2012) 28:22 New American 23.
18
See Jeffrey J Schott, “Economic Sanctions Against Iran: Is the Third Decade a Charm?” (2012) 47:3 Business
Economics 190. Also see Stanislav Mraz et al, “Economic Sanctions Against Iran and Their Effectiveness” (2016)
182 Aktual'ni Problemy Ekonomiky = Actual Problems in Economics 22.
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involved in any business relationships with Iran. Those that did took serious precautions to avoid
violating the multilateral or unilateral sanctions regimes. The most harmful of all are the unilateral
economic sanctions imposed by powerful states and economies. For example, in 2011 seven
corporations19 were punished by the US government because of involvement with petrol trade with
Iran20 and violation of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) regulations that ban companies from doing
business with Iran.21 A year later, an Iraqi and a Chinese bank were blacklisted for “business with
designated Iranian banks”.22 The extraterritorial reach of UCM has been practiced by the US before
as well, such as in 1996 when for the first time the US tried to deter foreign companies from
investing in Iran’s energy sector.23 This practice was then disputed by the EU and European firms
were prohibited from complying with the ISA.24 But in such situations, most companies cannot
afford provoking a powerful country like the US and try to stay away from investing in a
sanctioned country.25 As can be seen, the effectiveness of the unilateral sanctions depends on
coordinated action with other countries.26
The dominance of the US in the international financial system and global economy means
that US sanctions have a wider reach than just touching on assets and entities located within its
jurisdiction. Under most sanction programs, it is not only illegal for US persons to directly transact
with a sanctioned person, but also to facilitate a transaction.27 For example, banks acting as

19

These companies were registered in Venezuela, the UAE, Jersey, Singapore, Monaco and Israel.
See International Crisis Group (ICG), Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions (25 February
2013), Middle East Report N°138, online:<https://www.refworld.org/docid/512c78bf2.html> at 15.
21
Iran Sanctions Act, Public Law 104-172, 6 August 1996.
22
International Crisis Group, supra note 20, at 14.
23
Ibid at 7.
24
European Council Regulation (EC) no. 2271/96, Protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application
of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom (22 November 1996).
25
International Crisis Group, supra note 20, at 28 para 2.
26
Ibid, at 13 para 2.
27
Ibid.
20
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intermediaries between US persons and sanctioned persons can also be held liable for their role in
providing financial services or facilitating a transaction to or from a sanctioned person.
In his reports, and as recently at May 2019, Mr. Idriss Jazairy, the Special Rapporteur on
Negative Impacts of Unilateral Coercive Measures on Human Rights, has warned against major
powers resorting to their dominant positions in the international financial arena against their allies
in order to bring about economic hardship to the economy of other sovereign states. He has
concluded that this “extraterritorial application of unilateral sanctions” is contrary to international
law and undermines the human rights of the sanctioned states by destroying their economies.28 In
case of Iran, he has declared:
“I am deeply concerned that one State can use its dominant position in international
finance to harm not only the Iranian people, who have followed their obligations under the
UN-approved nuclear deal to this day, but also everyone in the world who trades with
them.”29
Jazairy has constantly emphasized the importance of engaging in constructive dialogue in order to
find a resolution “in compliance with the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations
before the arbitrary use of economic starvation becomes the new normal”.30 He has condemned
blockades that clearly ignore the state’s sovereignty and the human rights of its citizens as well as
the rights of third countries trading with sanctioned States.31
However, the analysis of coercive measures through the lens of BHR has been mostly
untouched by sanctions scholars.32 The purpose of this thesis is not to discuss why sanctions in

28

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “US Sanctions Violate Human Rights and
International
Code
of
Conduct,
UN
expert
Says”
(6
May
2019),
online:
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24566&LangID=E>.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
See Nigel D White, “UN Sanctions: Where Public Law Meets Public International Law (Book Review)” (2011)
74:3 Modern L Rev 456.
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general and economic sanctions in particular are doomed to fail.33 Instead, an attempt will be made
to investigate the implementation and impacts of coercive measures on the operation of
transnational corporations (TNCs) both from a practical perspective and a conceptual perspective.
Furthermore, the limits of sanctioning foreign entities under public international law will be
discussed. The main focus will remain on the home and host state duty to protect and the
identification and clarification of existing governance gaps in international normative standards in
the context of BHR. Suggestions will be made with regard to how international law and specifically
international BHR instruments should move beyond their current limitations and bridge the current
governance gap.
1.2. Structure
To accomplish the objectives of the thesis, the second chapter of the thesis considers how
the practice of the UNSC has been designed and what objectives are being followed by this
practice. This will be followed by an identification of other sources of sanctions law. After
providing an overview of sanctions law, the nature and mechanisms of the UNSC in identifying
potential threats to international peace and security and role of the UNSC veto will be discussed.
Later, the legal basis of the UNSC’s powers to impose non-military measures on member states
and other sources of the sanctions laws and UCM will be briefly reviewed.
In the third chapter, I thoroughly analyze what economic sanctions are, and will examine
whether, and if so, how sanctions including economic sanctions and UCM conform with

33

See Elena V McLean, "Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail" (2017) 15:1 Perspectives on
Politics 288. Also see Brendan Taylor, Sanctions as Grand Strategy, (Routledge: for The International Institute of
Strategic Studies, 2010).
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international human rights law, what objectives they follow, and in what ways coercive measures
could negatively impact business entities.
In the fourth and the fifth chapters of the thesis, the impact of coercive measures in general
and unilateral economic sanctions in particular on BHR will be analyzed, in order to assess whether
the sanctions regimes are in conflict with international instruments on BHR. To achieve this
purpose, an overview of the BHR and UN instruments will be provided, and the instruments
examined to determine whether sanctions have received any consideration. This will be followed
by an investigation of the impact of sanctions on TNCs and the issue of transnationality and
extraterritoriality on the home state duty when sanctions are imposed. Furthermore, the existing
gaps in international normative standards (UNGPs and OECD MNE Guidelines) on BHR will be
taken into deliberation.
The sixth chapter studies the impacts of sanctions on the operation of transnational
corporations in a sanctioned country such as Iran. The reports of the Human Rights Council’s
Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of the UCM on the enjoyment of human rights, Mr.
Idriss Jazairy, include many references to the unconformity of these sanctions with principles of
international law that I will concisely discuss. How can business enterprises respect human rights
and how can home states deliver on their duty to protect human rights in the context of sanctions
against Iran, are among the questions that I will try to answer. The ultimate purpose of this section
and indeed the concluding chapter is to discover what lessons could be learned and what policy
considerations must be taken into account in the context of sanctions and BHR.

8

1.3. Research Methodology
Even though there is no “generally accepted definition of the methodology of international
law”34, methodology in general “seeks to define the means of acquiring scientific knowledge”.35
In the area of international law, the methodology cannot be dissociated from sources of
international law. Martti Koskenniemi describes International law as “an argumentative practice”36
that is based on persuasive legal arguments,37 and sources of international law, as known, could
be found in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the international Court of Justice (ICJ)38.
Article 38(1) refers to obligatory sources of international law such as treaties that are
binding on state parties39, customary international law (rules of international customs) that are
binding on all states40, general principles of law that take a privileged place in the “positive legal
order”41 by filling gaps in international law and representing “the foundation of any legal
construction”42, and ultimately other means for the determination of rules of law such as judicial
decisions and the writings of publicists. There are, however, other instruments of international law,
known as soft law, that encompass guidelines (such as UNGPs or OECD MNE Guidelines),
declarations, as well as UN General Assembly resolutions. The critical analysis and interpretation
of law in this thesis has been informed by utilising many international normative standards (soft

34

Christian Dominice, Methodology of International Law (Geneva: Graduate Institute Publications, 1997) at 3-12.
Translated from French, available online:<https://books.openedition.org/iheid/1334?lang=en>.
35
Ibid.
36
Martti Koskenniemi, “Methodology of International Law” in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of
Public International Law (London: Oxford University Press, 2007).
37
Ibid.
38
Statute of the International Court of Justice, (June 26 1945), 59 Stat 1055, 33 UNTS 993.
39
See Antonio Cassese, International Law, 2d (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 170.
40
Ibid at 157.
41
Elena Anghel, “General Principles of Law” (2016) XXIII:2 Lex Et Scientia 120 at 120.
42
Ibid.
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laws) that are considered to be influential in the context of BHR, given the central importance of
“interpretation within human rights law”.43
This is a doctrinal thesis that utilizes a qualitative method and international legal analysis
to answer its questions by interpreting regulatory guidelines.44 This approach has facilitated the
analysis and communication of my thinking and ideas so that I am able to propose suggestions
about what the law ought to be as opposed to what it is and what it fails to cover. In addition, given
the focus of the thesis on the study of the transnational impacts and enforcement of sanctions as
well as the application of transnational normative frameworks in the context of sanctions, it is
important to highlight the importance of transnational law – law that goes well beyond the national
borders45 – in investigating the international mechanisms.

43

Martin Scheinin, “The Art and Science of Interpretation in Human Rights Law” in Bard A. Andreassen, Hans-Otto
Sano & Siobhan Mclnerney (eds) Research Methods in Human Rights: A Handbook (UK: Edgar Elgar Publishing,
2017) 17.
44
Many of the materials used in this thesis have taken a similar methodological approach to explain and to analyse
the international law materials. For instance, see Matthew Happold and Paul Eden (eds), Economic Sanctions and
International Law, (Hart Publishing, 2016).
45
See Peer Zumbansen, "Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance, and Legal
Pluralism" (2012) 21:2 Transnat'I L & Contemp Probs 305.
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Chapter II An Overview of Sanctions Law
2.1. Introduction
Prior to the fall of the Berlin wall, Article 41 of the UN Charter46 was merely used twice
to impose a trade embargo against Southern Rhodesia in 1966 and later an arms embargo against
South Africa in 1977.47 After the cold war era, however, sanctions are said to be the most
frequently employed tools of the UNSC and since then, 30 multilateral sanctions regimes have
been established by the Council. Apart from the UNSC, other states and other international
organizations have also imposed unilateral sanctions against other countries.48
This chapter provides an overview of sanctions law. The first part unfolds the nature and
mechanisms of the UNSC that identify potential threats to international peace and security, the
objectives underlying the imposition of sanctions, and the role of the veto power. The legal basis
for the UNSC’s powers to impose non-military measures on member states will also be discussed.
The second half of the chapter will briefly investigate other sources of sanctions laws including
UCM.

2.2. UNSC’s Nature and Mechanism:
Since its establishment in 1946, the structure of the UNSC has remained mostly
unchanged.49 As the UN’s principal crisis-management body, the UNSC has the primary

46

Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
A.S. Mlambo, “We Have Blood Relations over the Border: South Africa and Rhodesian Sanctions, 1965–
1975” (2008) 40:1 African Historical R 1 at 1–29.
48
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28 European countries and governing common economic, social, and security policies (for example, see European
Commission Restrictive Measures at supra note 5).
49
“The UN Security Council”, online: Council on Foreign Relations<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-securitycouncil>.
47
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responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.50 It is composed of 15 member
states that are empowered to impose binding obligations on the 193 UN member states by the
Charter of the United Nations.51 Each of the 15 members of the Council, that include five
permanent and ten elected members, has one vote and meet on a regular basis in order to examine
the existence “of a threat to peace or act of aggression”.52 These issues could be in relation to civil
wars, natural disasters, arms control or terrorism.53
The UNSC demands parties involved in a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and
recommends methods of adjustment or appropriate procedures.54 The UNSC could resort to
imposing sanctions or authorize the use of force if needed.55 UNSC’s voting power has been
governed by Article 27 of the UN Charter and rule 40 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure56.
UNSC Members can cast their votes on procedural and non-procedural matters.57

2.2.1. UNSC’s Functions and Powers:
Articles 24-26 of the Charter of the United Nations cover the functions and powers of the
UNSC.58 Specifically, its primary responsibility which is maintenance of international peace and
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Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council. (Princeton: Princeton
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security is pointed out by Article 24(1)59 and has been also reaffirmed or reiterated implicitly in
the last four UNSC’s presidential statements.60 More importantly, the UNSC also highlights “the
link between its own primary responsibility and the role or responsibility of other actors, namely,
member states and regional organizations”.61
Article 25 points out the obligation of the member states to accept and carry out the
decisions of the UNSC. A recent example of invoking this article is UNSC 7739th meeting, held
on July 2016 to discuss the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) which endorsed the Joint
Comprehensive Action Plan (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear program. Many member states welcomed
the progress made in the agreement implementation and considered it a step forward for
international peace and security.62 In this session, different states’ delegations emphasized the
implementation of resolution 2231 and that all states including Iran must act in accordance with
all the provisions of this resolution.63 Later, it was also considered irresponsible to “selectively
implement the provisions” of the resolution endorsing the JCPOA.64 So the importance of the
effective implementation of the UNSC’s decisions in accordance with article 25 has been
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United Nations, Security Council, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 20th Supplement, 2016-2017
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60
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paragraph; UNSCOR, 8082nd Mtg, UN Doc S/PRST/2017/21 (31 October 2017) at third paragraph.
61
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Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Ibid at 23. Also see UNSC, 7739th Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.7739 (18
July 2016), at 5.
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Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Ibid at 25 para 1. Also see, UNSC, 8143rd Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.8143
(19 December 2017), at 11.
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repeatedly discussed regardless of the involvement of states in the design of a particular set of
sanctions.65
As set out by Article 29 of the UN Charter, the UNSC may also “establish subsidiary bodies
as needed for the performance of its functions”.66 Thus, UNSC has a number of committees,
working groups and Ad Hoc bodies that are all composed of the fifteen Council members.67 These
subsidiary organs may have mandates that include a range of procedural (e.g. documentation and
procedures, meetings away from headquarters) to substantive issues (e.g. sanctions regimes,
counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations).68 Among the UNSC committees that support the
Council’s mission, the sanctions committee deals with the imposition of the mandatory sanctions
on a state or entity in order to make them comply with the objectives set by the UNSC without
resorting to the use of force.69 The sanctions committee, thus, is a political/administrative body
with a complex and politicized practice and every member of the UNSC is a member of it. .70

2.2.2. UNSC and The Rationale of the Right to Veto
Each of the five permanent members of the UNSC known as P5 , can veto a Council’s
resolution.71 This is not the case for the ten elected members and states with veto hold more voting
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power.72 Some argue that having no veto power for non-permanent members means they almost
have no power and a fair approximation in this regard is that the UNSC has merely five members.73
The privileged status of the P5 stems from the roles these countries played in the
establishment of the UN in the aftermath of World War II. The victors of the war, the US, Soviet
Union and the UK determined “the post war political order” by shaping what then become the
UN.74 They later added the Republic of China (Taiwan) and France.75 This voting arrangement
proposal that was put forward in February 1945 at the conference of Yalta, faced unsuccessful
protests by other states due to “an unacceptable infringement on the sovereign equality of states”
but the permanent members made it clear that the veto power was “a conditio sine qua” for their
participation in establishing the UN.76
Even though the term “veto” was carefully avoided in article 27,77 major powers consider
the concept of unanimity78 as the rationale of the veto power79 that is also required in order for the
UN itself to survive.80
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Normally, states do not propose any clarification or rationale as to their incentives for
casting a vote which is confusing. Also, the use of the so called “hidden veto” or “pocket veto”
which routinely happens behind closed doors in informal consultation meetings is problematic.81
A hidden veto happens when one of the P5 “threatens to use its veto if a certain measure or
statement is put to vote”.82 As a result of this, there are numerous cases in which draft resolutions
have not been formally tabled.83
The UN Charter gives enormous formal powers to the UNSC but never the tools to directly
control the powers that are given to it.84 The use of the veto by the P5 has multiple objectives
including "defending their national interests”, “upholding a tenet of their foreign policy” or, in
some cases, promoting a single issue of particular importance to a state.85
In the 2005 UNSC summit, the permanent members were called upon to “pledge
themselves to refrain from the use of the veto in cases of the genocide and large scale human roots
abuses”.86 This was later echoed by the French foreign minister in 2013 when making reference to
a possible “code of conduct to rein in the veto under such dire circumstances”.87 The High
Commissioner for Human Rights supported the French initiative and called on the P5 to
“voluntarily and collectively pledge not to use the veto in case of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes on a large scale”.88

Chapnick, “Reforming the Security Council: What Goes Around, Comes Around.” (2005) 26:7 Policy Options 21.
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2.2.2.1. Abuse of Veto Power and Proposed Reforms
The existence of the veto power of the UNSC’s permanent members has been considered
as a “traditional stumbling block” that has empowered the P5 to “block any resolution that is not
merely procedural in nature”.89 It is also argued that as an unjust tool, veto has been the main
reason why UNSC has failed to react adequately to some humanitarian crises such as in Rwanda
1994 and Darfur 2004.90 Also, some critics point out the biased nature of the veto power that is
“the most unfair and inequitable law of the world which enables a powerful and authoritative
minority to determine the fate of an indispensable and subjugated majority".91 Due to this, a great
number of states wish to abolish or restrain this right. However, it has not happened yet since any
amendment of the UN Charter (pursuant to articles 108 and 109) requires the P5 votes and
ratifications.
Due to the unjust nature of the right to veto, ever since the creation of the UN, the debate
on the necessity of the UN and veto reform has never stopped. Nevertheless, some argue that
“trying to get rid of veto is like trying to get rid of politics” so other member states should make
peace with it and consider it a price that has to be paid in order to keep the UN functioning
properly.92
As recently as November 2018, in the 73rd session of the General Assembly, the necessary
changes and reforms that have to occur at the UNSC level were discussed. The need to reform
mainly stems from the current “complex international security and peace architecture”, that
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requires adaptation to new political realities that could increasingly boost the legitimacy and
implementation of the UNSC decisions.93 The ideal changes ranged from “broadening the number
of permanent members beyond the current five” to “abolishing the permanent membership’s use
of veto power to overrule the adoption of draft resolutions”.94 The latter was rejected by the
representatives of the US and Russian Federation. Conceivably, the best solution would be the
creation of an accountability mechanism that would strengthen and increase the legitimacy of the
UNSC.95
All in all, the right to veto blocks the opportunity for equitable involvement in peace and security
questions for all member states and also undermines multilateralism. On the other hand, for the
purpose of this thesis it is also important to know that there are instances where powerful P5 states
resort to imposing UCM, in order to refrain from being vetoed at the UNSC. This is why explaining
the veto power is a critical part of this chapter. Nevertheless, perhaps, as emphasized by the
representative of Iran at the 73rd session of the GA, the further involvement and fair representation
of developing countries in the UNSC could strengthen the UNSC and prevent permanent members’
tendency to downgrade the council. 96

2.3. UNSC and the use of Coercive Measures
The UN collective security machinery that bears the responsibility of maintaining or
restoring international peace and security could pursue enforcement measures, including military
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or economic measures, to meet its objectives.97 These measures could lead to interference in the
domestic affairs of states. Thus, while article 2(7) of the UN Charter “prohibits the UN from
intervening in domestic affairs of states”, Chapter VII authorizes the application of enforcement
measures. The UNSC is the determining institution as to when to use the coercive measures in
situations where international peace and security is threatened.98 After the Cold War, the limited
power of the P5 to use coercive measures expanded and UNSC started to take a different path.
First, the concept of the security and the threats to the international peace and security developed
a broader meaning.99 Furthermore, there was a sharp increase in the use of Chapter VII and
operations authorized by it.100 To clarify, the following section will provide an overview on the
non-military practice of the Council.

2.3.1. UNSC Sanction practice and the Rule of Law
It was mentioned that maintaining international peace was the primary purpose for the
establishment of the UN by the UN Charter in the final months of World War II. The formal
purposes of the UN that are outlined in Article 1 of the UN Charter stress this primary purpose.
To achieve this purpose, the UN resorts to the imposition of sanctions or military actions. While
military action (the use of force) is a last resort, non-military sanctions aim to change non-
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compliant state behaviour that threatens international peace and security while avoiding the use of
force.
The application of sanctions could follow different objectives and a wide range of actors
will be responsible for sanctions administration and monitoring.101 However, the important issue
of whether and if so, how sanctions could or have strengthened the rule of law remains unanswered.
In order to answer this question, Farrall critically evaluates the track-record of the UN sanctions
system, identifying shortcomings in respect of the key principles of the rule of law which seek to
prevent the abuse of power. The key principles of the rule of law include principles of transparency,
consistency, equality, due process and proportionality.102
As an outstanding part of the UNSC’s sanctions regime, the concept of rule of law is a
matter of process and should be differentiated from “the issue of legality” that is mainly about
substance.103 In various meetings of the UNSC, it has been emphasized by states’ representatives
and high level UN officials that sanctions are instruments that could “strengthen, promote and
reinforce the rule of law”.104 It was also suggested that the UNSC’s actions “should both promote
and respect the rule of law”.105 If sanctions are expected to reinforce the rule of law,106 then it is
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logical to put every effort to diminish the unintended and adverse consequences of sanctions upon
civilian populations, business entities and third states.107
However, Farrall demonstrates that so far, the UNSC’s sanctions practice “has largely
failed to respect and promote the core elements of the rule of law”.108 Nevertheless, he argues that
the UNSC is capable of improving the rule of law record of UN sanctions by taking simple steps
to strengthen, respect and promote each of the five key rule of law principles.109 Policy innovations
and developments such as replacing comprehensive sanctions with targeted sanctions, is an
example to the reforms that have already been implemented by UNSC.110 While targeted sanctions
also have many collateral damages, it is alleged that they have resulted in “improved record with
respect to the element of proportionality”.111
However, the system requires further and more substantial reforms because of the major
shortcomings that it has in its sanctions practice.112 Farall advances some reform recommendations
to enhance UN sanctions system capacity to strengthen rule of law. First, he suggests that UNSC
should improve the transparency of its sanctions-related decisions, in order to demonstrate that “its
actions are taken in accordance with legitimate authority”.113 Holding public discussions or open
session meetings (by the sanctions committee) concerning probable application of sanctions could
be a good example for this .114 Additionally, UNSC should also exercise its power in a consistent
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and predictable manner in order to respect the principle of consistency.115 As an example,
establishing a consolidated sanctions-related body may result in improved consistency.116
Even though in a legal context all parties must be considered equal before the law, the use
of veto has undermined the principle of equality. To promote equality, use of veto must be
minimized by the UNSC.117 Furthermore, Farrall emphasizes the importance of the application of
the principle of due process in granting target states the opportunity of a fair hearing to express
their points of view.118 The UNSC could also provide due process through presenting objective
assessment of fact-finding groups.119 Last and perhaps the most important consideration that must
be taken into account in the context of sanctions is the principle of proportionality. The coercive
consequences of the applications of sanctions should remain in proportion to the threat to the peace
posed by the target state.120 The principle of proportionality could be respected by conducting a
humanitarian impact assessment before applying the sanctions regime.121

2.3.2. UN Sanctions: Definition

It is rather challenging to find a commonly-agreed definition for sanctions under
international law.122 The UN Charter does not explicitly define the term “sanctions” and merely
refers to them as measures that the UNSC may take under Chapter VII against a state in order to
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restore or maintain international peace and security.123 Nevertheless, some define sanctions as
“coercive measures taken in execution of a decision of a competent social organ, i.e., an organ
legally empowered to act in the name of the society or community that is governed by the legal
system.”124 Similarly, Schrijver defines the collective sanctions applied by the UNSC as “measures
imposed by organs representing the international community, in response to perceived unlawful
or unacceptable conduct by one of its members and meant to uphold standards of behavior required
by international law.”125

As opposed to military actions, sanctions are considered “valuable instruments in
international efforts to safeguard peace and security and to promote democracy and human rights”
according to the definition provided by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.126 As allegedly
peaceful means of international law, sanctions are imposed through a collective decision process
by other states in order to influence states’ behaviors and polices threatening international peace
and security. The temporary nature of sanctions is due to the fact that when the specified objectives
are achieved, the sanctions regime will be removed.127 Thus, the idea is to use sanctions as a mean
to promote peace and security but in reality, sanctions are mostly incapable of delivering this and
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may result in distorting peace.128 Moreover, even though sanctions are permitted under UN charter,
some argue that they actually contradict the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)129
by violating “the right to live in dignity” through “denying civilians of a target State the
opportunity to live in dignity due to the negative consequences and aspects often associated with
such measures” thus their legality is in question.130

2.3.3. UN Sanctions: Beginning and Legal Basis
As to the legal basis for the UNSC’s power to impose sanctions, Chapter VII of the UN
Charter comprising articles 39-51, “provides a broad framework for taking action to maintain or
restore international peace and security” and encompasses “general powers and responsibilities”
of the UNSC in this regard.131 According to articles 39 and 41 that are considered key provisions
“governing the application of non-military sanctions”, when the UNSC determines the existence
of any "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”, it should further decide what
military or non-military actions are required “to maintain or restore international peace and
security” in accordance with article 41 and 42.132 If the UNSC determines that taking measures in
the form of non-military sanctions is required, this decision is legally binding on UN member
states and they are obligated to comply with and implement those sanctions. This legal obligation
stems from Articles 25, 103 and 2(5) of the UN Charter.133
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Thus, sanctions are considered as supportive peaceful means to back up the UN’s effort of
maintaining international peace and security.134 UNSC sanctions entails a range of measures
including “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations”.135 The UNSC determine the imposition of coercive measures on responsible
individuals, entities or states through adopting a new resolution establishing a new sanctions
regime.136 As part of the sanctions resolution, a sanctions committee will be established with the
role of implementing, monitoring and providing recommendations on the particular sanctions
regime to the Council.137 Also, for the purpose of better implementation of the sanctions, in some
cases an expert panel is created to assist them in implementation and prepare reports based on its
findings.138 Once the conflict situation is solved or improved, UN sanctions will be lifted.139
One might think that a central concern of the UNSC should be due regard for human rights
in sanctions implementation. However, a famous and rather recent example of the UN sanctions
regimes that manifestly failed was the Oil-for-Food Program that was meant to ensure
humanitarian services after Iraq invaded Kuwait. This sanctions program was impaired by
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations
under the present Charter shall prevail".
134
Kondoch 2016, supra note 124.
135
“UN Sanctions: What They Are, How They Work, and Who Uses Them” online: United Nations
News<https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/05/528382-un-sanctions-what-they-are-how-they-work-and-who-usesthem>.
136
see Devon Whittle, “The Limits of Legality and the United Nations Security Council: Applying the Extra-Legal
Measures Model to Chapter VII Action” (2015) 26:3 European J Intl L 671.
137
For example, by Resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006, the UNSC established a Committee to oversee and
monitor the UN sanctions imposed against Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. See
Michele Gaietta, The Trajectory of Iran's Nuclear Program. First ed, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). The
Committee, also, in a situation where sanctions are being imposed on a state party, considers two sets of obligations;
First, with regards to the affected states and second regarding the party responsible for imposition, maintenance or
implementation of the sanctions. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Relationship between
Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ECOSOC, UN Doc. E/C.12/1997/8.
138
For example, Resolution S/RES/2159 renewed for 13 months the Panel of Experts assisting the 1373 Iran Sanctions
Committee. See SC Res 2159, UNSCOR, 7193rd Sess, UN Doc SC/11432 (9 June 2014).
139
For example, following the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actions, most UN Sanctions against Iran were lifted in
January 2016.

25

corruption and exploitation after being revealed that about 2000 firms mostly located in P5
countries “paid kickbacks totaling nearly $2 billion to the Iraqi government”.140 Thus, protection
of the human rights of the targeted states as an important aspect of sanctions regimes must be
respected in the sanctions context. With this regard, the General Assembly in the 2005 World
Summit Declaration called on members of the international community to ensure that “fair and
clear procedures are in place for the imposition and lifting of sanctions measures”.141

2.4. Other Sources of Sanctions
Sanctions, as alternatives to military actions, could come in various forms and types
including “comprehensive and targeted sanctions” and “unilateral and multilateral sanctions".142
There could also be other forms of coercive measures that include economic, social and political
sanctions. There are many scholars and NGOs that discuss the terrible humanitarian consequences
of economic sanctions and argue against the use of them.143 Nevertheless, given the fact that
sanctions have different angles, such as historical, economic, ethical, political, and legal aspects,
it is possible to analyze them through different lenses. But the important issues associated with
sanctions are their effectiveness, objectives and the strategies behind them. For the purpose of this
thesis, it is important to differentiate between different forms of sanctions to better understand
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their legal status in international law and later in BHR instruments. Therefore, the next sections
will provide a brief description of different forms of coercive measures and their imposition.

2.4.1. Unilateral Vs. Multilateral Sanctions:
The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) defines
UCM, as “economic measures taken by one state to compel a change in the policy of another
state”.144 Trade sanctions in the form of embargoes and the interruption of financial and investment
flows between sender and target country, are examples of such measures. The impact of unilateral
sanctions on the full enjoyment of human rights has been of great concern. Due to the seriousness
of this issue, UN member states have discussed it in various resolutions such as resolution
A/67/118 regarding the necessity to end economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by
the US against Cuba,145 and resolution A/66/138 regarding UCM as a means of political and
economic coercion against developing countries.146 Moreover, the issue of legality of such
measures from a human rights perspective have been investigated in many UN working
papers.147 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action148 adopted by the World Conference
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on Human Rights in 1993 called upon States to refrain from any unilateral measure not in
accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations because they will create
“obstacles to trade relations among States and impede the full realization of the human rights” set
forth in UDHR and in other international human rights instruments.149
Multilateral sanctions, on the other hand, are expected to impose “greater terms of trade
effects on a target nation” than unilateral sanctions.150 Nevertheless, many scholars argue that even
though multilateral sanctions cause greater damage to the target state, they are less effective in
producing the desired political outcome mainly due to the fact that the multilateral coalition is
unable to enforce cooperation among members.151 Haufbauer, Schott, and Elliot also demonstrate
that in fact unilateral sanctions “work more often that multilateral sanctions”.152 Others, however,
argue that the effectiveness of unilateral or multilateral sanctions “depends on the number of issues
at stake, specially whether an international institution is involved or not”.153

2.4.2. Targeted vs Comprehensive Sanctions:

Currently, formerly comprehensive in nature sanctions have turned into smart or targeted
sanctions that are basically targeted against specific individuals and/or nongovernmental
entities.154 Comprehensive economic and trade sanctions have been only imposed against
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Rhodesia, South Africa, Yugoslavia and Iraq since the establishment of the UN .155 They deny a
target State’s access to “international markets and other sources of finance and funding, with the
exception of those exempted on humanitarian grounds”.156 The US and the European Union (EU)
also enforce such sanctions particularly by using international institutions such as the World Bank
and the IMF.157

Targeted sanctions, that are known to be less harmful to civilians than comprehensive
sanctions, were first imposed in 1992 on the government of Libya. Some consider smart sanctions
“a useful focal point for policy coordination among powers”158 but others argue that the lack of
systematic evidence to prove this is noticeable.159 Thus, even though they are believed to be less
harmful to civilians than comprehensive economic sanctions, “inconsistent implementation”,
“ambiguity in identifying the specific targeted individuals” and the resulting “inevitable effect on
untargeted, unintended and innocent actors” make them as damaging and destructive .160

Unlike comprehensive sanctions that are imposed by international bodies like the UNSC
(in political cases) or the World Trade Organization (in economic cases), unilateral sanctions are
often imposed by a single state on a third party on reasons that are related to the targeting state’s
national interest.161 The US, for instance, has been recently extensively imposing unilateral
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sanctions through national legislation. The UN Special Rapporteur on Unilateral Coercive
Measures (UNSR) considers the use and permissibility of these types of sanctions to be noncompliant with the rule of law.162 Moreover, some scholars have examined the effectiveness of
these type of sanctions and came to the conclusion that they failed to make any significant change
in the target state’s policy and behavior.163

2.5. Conclusion
UNSC was mostly prevented from imposing coercive measures provided for in Article 41
of the UN Charter by cold war politics and merely employed its sanction tools twice from 1946
until the middle of 1990 against Rhodesia and South Africa. However, UN sanctions are now
considered to be “a prominent feature of the international relations landscape” as after the cold
war, sanctions become a popular tool.164
The popularity of sanctions and their increasing imposition by the UNSC is attributed to
two contributing factors. The first reason is their less unpalatable nature in comparison with other
coercive alternatives such as military actions. As a result of this, the UNSC is more inclined to
maintain or restore peace and security by employing sanctions measures. Furthermore, from a
political point of view, even though Article 42 of the UN Charter authorizes the use of military
action, collecting necessary support for such measures could be extremely difficult due to their
serious political, humanitarian and also financial consequences for the governments involved.165
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Having said that, the political structure of the UNSC and the right to veto makes UN
sanctions regimes unreliable and too political. Extensive reforms are necessary to make coercive
measures effective and to limit the collateral damages arising from the imposition of sanctions.
Nevertheless, effective coercive measures is defined as measures that will punish the target state
for its wrongdoing without punishing civilians. The question is that whether it is at all possible to
achieve the desired outcomes without any collateral damage and without violating human rights?
Also, the UN Charter is silent upon the important question of what steps should be taken by the
UNSC to ensure that the imposition of UN sanctions will not violate human rights of individuals
residing in target states. On the other hand, powerful states like the US resort to imposing UCM,
in order to refrain from being vetoed at the UNSC. Thus, while P5 and many powerful states are
capable of imposing coercive measures through the UNSC and also unilaterally (even though
unilateral coercive measures are against the principles of international law), other states will be the
target of these sanctions .166 As will be explained in the next chapter, studies show that often neither
multilateral nor unilateral sanctions result in a target state’s change of behavior and the devastating
impacts of sanctions will only bring about hardship and poverty for the civilians.
To better understand the issue of sanctions and its impacts on BHR, the next chapter will
focus on the role of economic sanctions, their objectives, implementation and their human rights
impacts. In addition, the conformity of economic sanctions with international human rights law
will be investigated.
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Chapter III Economic Sanctions and Critiques
“States resort to unilateral sanctions to coerce other States to their will, but innocent victims
bear the brunt of the suffering. Diplomatic solutions are difficult and sometimes slow, but they
are definitely the preferred alternatives”167

3.1. Introduction:
Most state officials and scholars believe that economic sanctions are a great alternative to
armed conflicts. This can be due to the fact that sanctions “generate a sense of civic virtue, without
incurring unacceptable domestic political costs” and enable the sender countries to avoid the
political backlash of sending armies to receiver country.168 Also, states (whether democratic or
not) may be encouraged to impose sanctions in the face of foreign misconduct instead of sending
troops due to the “sense of moral superiority” that accompanies their application.169
This being said, there is a considerable amount of literature on sanctions and their collateral
damage to the rights of civilian populations as well as their humanitarian impacts on the target
state.170 This chapter will first investigate the nature of UNSC’s economic sanctions, and then will
address how UCM including economic sanctions conform with the international human rights law,
what objectives they follow, and in what ways these measures could negatively impact business
entities.
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3.2. Economic Sanctions Under the UN Charter
Among all types of sanctions, economic sanctions are the most controversial and disputed.
Economic sanctions include a wide range of measures such as “selective or comprehensive ban on
trade, a prohibition on some or all capital and service transactions with the government or nationals
of the offending country, an interdiction of transport and communication, and a freezing of
assets”.171 Economic sanctions imposed by the UN, could either be based on UN Charter Chapter
VII (as extensively discussed in the previous chapter) or could be recommended by the UNSC or
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Also, while UNGA resolutions are not binding
on the UN member states, measures taken under Art. 41 of the UN Charter by the UNSC are
mandatory.172 There is, also, another form of economic sanctions that must be distinguished from
UN economic sanctions and those are economic countermeasures that are “bilateral, imposed in
peacetime, and generally considered to be lawful unless not prohibited by the national law”.173
Apart from the scholars who have discussed the negative impacts of sanctions on the
enjoyment of human rights, in December 1997, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights adopted a General Comment on “the relationship between sanctions and respect
for economic social and cultural rights”.174 The General Comment emphasized that sanctions can
result in violation of basic economic, social and cultural rights, thus, it is important to safeguard
the rights of the vulnerable in target countries. The concept of smart sanctions, that was
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recommended by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in his Millennium Report,175 and aimed to
spare the civilian population while targeting the political leaders or those responsible for the threat
or breach of the peace, was basically a response to the critics of UN sanctions that suggested
sanctions regimes have "unintended adverse consequences” that must be avoided.176

3.2.1. Economic Sanctions : Objectives
As stated in the previous chapter, under Article 41, the UNSC has the responsibility to
identify the legal basis and scope of the sanctions as alternatives for military actions, as well as the
objectives they follow.177 However, in general, the objective of sanctions are usually two-fold: an
implicit general objective and a more specific objective. The latter concentrates on addressing the
particular threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression that has led to the imposition of
sanctions, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.178
Nevertheless, the ultimate purpose of imposing sanctions (general objective) is punishment
for the target state’s wrongdoing.179 Economic sanctions that are imposed for the purpose of
“forcing the government of target state to adjust new policies” are defined as “coordinated
restrictions on trade and financial transactions intended to impair economic life within a given
territory”.180 Also, apart from punishment, the imposition of sanctions might follow other
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rationales such as deterrence, coercion or compliance, subversion, international/domestic
symbolism and message sending.181
Deterrence may be defined as deterring other states from unwanted behavior, “by
demonstrating the probable consequences or cost of misbehavior”.182 A classic example for this is
the trade ban and a complete embargo against Cuban Financial institutions by the US.183 The aim
was to “demonstrate a prompt reaction in order to deter and intimidate those states throughout
Latin America that supported the Castro policy.”184 This strategy, however, has faced lots of
criticisms due to low success rate in achieving desired outcomes.185
Contrary to the use of deterrence, coercion aims to prevent any unwanted military
escalation by seeking the target state’s behavioural change due to some actions that are already in
process.186 Similar to deterrence, this approach cannot be considered “a successful tool of
democracy”, since it has led to implementing more drastic measures (such as the threat of military
force) in some cases.187 The failure of coercive diplomacy can be observed in the First Persian
Gulf War, in 1990, after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces.188
Another major strategy of sanctions is destabilization that is based on the assumption that
the economic pressure would trigger the civilians in the target country to rise up against their
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government and this could result in leaders losing their office.189 A successful example of
application of this strategy is the downfall of Allende’s administration after public frustrations
resulted from the financial hardship caused by US economic sanctions against Chile in 1970.190
Similarly, the recent coercive measures imposed against Iran by the US is partly following this
strategy (regime change), according to US officials.191
As discussed, it can be concluded that economic sanctions follow different objectives (or
a combination of objectives) in that achieving them usually involves third parties. Also, while
many factors could impact achieving the favorable outcome, in most cases the application of
sanctions affects civilians negatively. The next section will investigate the legal limitation of
sanctions.

3.3. UNSC Economic Sanctions: Critiques
The legal limitations upon sanctions regimes,192 the relationship between sanctions and
human rights law,193 the legal problems concerning the implementation of sanctions under
domestic laws,194 and the legality of countermeasures against wrongful sanctions, are among the

189

Ibid, Lumen, at 15 para 1.
Ibid. See further William Leo Grande “A Policy Long Past Its Expiration Date: US Economic Sanctions Against
Cuba” (2015) 82:4 Social Research 939. Kondoch critiques this agenda and argue against it. See Boris Kondoch, “The
Limits of Economic Sanctions under International Law: The Case of Iraq” (2001) 7 J Intl Peacekeeping 267.
191
See Jason Rezaian, “Call your Iran Policy By its True Name”, Washington Post (30July 2019), online:<
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/07/30/call-your-iran-policy-by-its-truename/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c4354edfaa99>. Also see Michael Gordon & Felicia Schwartz, “World News: U.S.
Weighs New Sanctions on Iran --- Trump Officials Urge Support for Protests amid Concerns over Intensifying
Crackdown.” Wall Street Journal (1 January 2018) online:< https://www.wsj.com/articles/on-iran-trumpadministration-encourages-support-for-protestors-1514848920>.
192
Generally, see Susan Emmenegger, “Extraterritorial Economic Sanctions and Their Foundation in International
Law” (2016) 33 Arizona J Intl & Comparative L 631.
193
Generally, see Eugenia López-Jacoiste, “The UN Collective Security System and its Relationship with Economic
Sanctions and Human Rights” (2010) 14:1 Max Planck YB United Nations L 273.
194
Generally, see Edward McWhinney “Extraterritorial sanctions and legality under international and domestic law”
(2000) 94:1 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting-American Society Intl L 94, 82.
190

36

issues considered by scholars in the context of sanctions.195 For the purpose of this thesis, the
controversial issue of the exact scope of the substantive legal limits of sanctions will be considered,
followed by briefly analyzing the principle of proportionality and the nature of jus cogens
obligations.
As discussed in Chapter II, one of the major characteristics of UNSC sanctions is their
binding nature that stems from Article 41 of the UN Charter that supersedes states obligations
under any other international agreements as part of a UNSC resolution based on Article 103.196
However, “the supremacy of the UN obligations over that of states in respect to their domestic or
other international commitments” is widely disputed.197 Some argue that the principle of
reasonableness of international norms is in contrast with supremacy of such international norms
over domestic norms..198
Another important issue for the purpose of this thesis is the collateral damages of economic
sanctions on civilian populations and businesses. The authorization of the humanitarian
exemptions to mitigate the impacts of sanctions seems to be ineffective.199 Moreover, economic
sanctions are suspected to be politically motivated due to the way in which the resolutions are
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passed by the UNSC.200 In addition, another criticism of UNSC resolutions is their “self-serving
nature” and their “ambiguity”.201
Former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, refers to sanctions as “blunt
instruments” that might carry catastrophic results by harming the civilian population of target
states.202 Similarly, Boris Kondoch mentions that the UNSC’s sanctions are believed to be rooted
in double standards since they mostly target underprivileged and poor countries of the south.203 As
an example, the UNSC rightfully imposed economic sanctions against Iraq after it invaded Kuwait
in 1990. However, no such measures were taken in similar cases such as cases of Israel-Palestine,
Turkey-Cyprus, or China-Tibet.

3.3.1. Missing Legal and Constitutional Concept
One critical point in analyzing the legality of economic sanctions is their incompatibility
with international human rights law due to their adverse impacts on human rights of the target
state’s civilians while they spare the political leaders.204 The humanitarian exemptions are also
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usually insufficient and major studies have showed that the impact of unilateral measures fall most
heavily on the poor.205 Establishing proper monitoring mechanisms on the application of sanctions
is considered to be a solution to this critical issue.
Lack of transparency is another common criticism when talking about UN sanctions
regime. The imposition of sanctions is supervised by the UNSC’s sanction committee “which
operates secretly and cannot be monitored or held publicly accountable”.206 As is also mentioned
by UN Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impacts of Unilateral Coercive Measures on Human
Rights, an impact assessment on the humanitarian impacts of the sanctions would revise the current
missing legal concept.
Sanctions, additionally, have devastating unintended effects on third parties including
neighbors and major trading partners. For example, as Boris Kondoch explains in the case of the
sanctions imposed on Iraq, “21 countries have claimed losses in their revenues as a result of
damage to their economic links with Iraq”.207
However, perhaps the most disputable issue stems from the wording of Articles 103 and
25 of the UN Charter that put UNSC’s act above international law and as a result of which,
collective sanctions imposed under Chapter VII are associated with no legal limitations. Many,
however, disregard this interpretation since they believe such disregard for the rule of law is in
contrast with the role of UNSC to maintain international peace and security and believe that this
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objective cannot be achieved through disrespect for rule of law.208 To support this argument,
Kondoch refers to the doctrine of jus cogens209, as the hard core of human rights and international
humanitarian law that are non-derogable and will apply to enforcement measures taken by the
UNSC under Chapter VII as well.210 Furthermore, he argues since “promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” are among basic objectives and principles of
the UN, and Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter oblige the UNSC to work in accordance with the
principles and purposes of the UN, doing otherwise is violating such principles.211 The next section
will investigate this issue in more details.

3.3.2. The Applicability of International Legal Standards to Economic Sanctions
Unfortunately, the common assumption is that only military intervention can lead to
destruction, while other instruments of enforcement such as economic sanctions also carry serious
long-term and short-term collateral damages.212 Thus, this false speculation that excludes sanctions
from destructive means also insulates them from being subjected to International Humanitarian
Law (IHL) principles that include military instruments. As the principles of necessity,
proportionality and distinction are considered to be “the legal yardsticks for determining the extent

208

Kondoch 2001, supra note 171, at 282. Also See H.-P. Gasser, ‘Collective Economic Sanctions and International
Humanitarian Law - An Enforcement Measure under the United Nations Charter and the Right of Civilians to
Immunity: An Unavoidable Clash of Policy Goals’ (1996) 56 ZaöRV 880- 881.
209
Jus cogens or peremptory norms of general international law are recognized and well-established norms that are
peremptory in nature and from which no derogation is allowed. These norms are also mentioned in Article 53 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which states that any treaty in conflict with jus cogens is considered void.
Jus cogens are also reaffirmed in many ICJ rulings including the Nicaragua Case in which jus cogens are named as
accepted doctrine in international law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
US), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Jun. 27). Also see Kamul Hossain, “The concept of Jus Cogens and the obligation under the UN
Charter” (2005) 3:1 Santa Clara J Intl L 71 at 77.
210
Kondoch 2001, supra note 171, at 282.
211
Ibid at 282 para 2.
212
Robin Geiss, "Humanitarian Safeguards in Economic Sanctions Regimes: A Call for Automatic Suspension
Clauses, Periodic Monitoring, and Follow-up Assessment of Long-Term Effects" (2005) 18 Harv Hum Rts J 167, at
169 para 3.

40

of permissible collateral damage”, it is suggested that establishing a legal framework based on IHL
could enable an effective and lawful implementation of sanctions, based on which sanctions will
be necessary and proportionate, periodically assessed, and relief could be provided to injured third
parties.213
To conclude, considering sanctions as inherently non-destructive instruments is a false
perception and analyzing the actual consequences of applying non-military coercive measures
would actually illustrate “how aggressively applied sanctions can be analogous to the military
instrument and objectionable on the same grounds”.214 Nevertheless, as far-reaching as it looks,
perhaps regulating sanctions in the light of IHL principles of necessity, proportionality and
discrimination could help to mitigate the negative consequences of sanctions slightly.215

3.4. United Nations and its Recent Approach Towards the Use of UCM:
Unilateral sanctions are vastly criticized as being “contrary to international law” as well as
“in breach of the rights of the states targeted by such measures” by the UN General Assembly and
the Human Rights Council.216 The lawfulness or unlawfulness of UCM has also been the subject
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of the discussion by the International Court of Justice in the “Nicaragua case”.217 As Happold
explains,218 ICJ decisions do not bind states to continue their trade relations, beyond the existence
of a treaty commitment or other legal obligations.219 As can be seen, the ICJ does not consider
sanctions in contrast with states’ customary obligations and give them the freedom to maintain or
interrupt trade relationship with other states.
However, Happold refers to the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration220 and Article 32 of
the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 221 that prohibits states from “use or
encourage the use of economic, political or any other types of measures to coerce another state in
order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights”.222 Resolutions
adopted by the General Assembly are also recent examples of considering UCM contrary to
international law, international humanitarian law, the UN Charter and the norms and principles
governing peaceful relations among states.223 Resolution 68/180, and resolution 68/200 reiterate
the same position. 224
Resolution 68/200 also urges adoption of urgent and effective measures against the use of
coercive measures against developing countries since use of such measures are in contrast with the
basic principles of the multilateral trading system.225 A similar position is held by the Human
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Rights Council through passing similar resolutions, which was followed by appointing a Special
Rapporteur on the Negative Impacts of the Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of
Human Rights in 2014.226
Additionally, numerous resolutions and declarations outline the legal limitations as to the
imposition of UCM with regards to rights essential for dignity and survival, while drawing
attention to the need for special measures to alleviate the negative impact of such measures on
women and children.227 For example, resolution 27/21 and Corr.1adopted by the Human Rights
Council stresses that UCM and related legislations are contrary to International Law, IHL, the
Charter and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States.228 The Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action,229 adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in
1993, also calls upon States to refrain from imposing coercive measures that create obstacles to
trade relations among States and impedes the full realization of the human rights set forth in the
UDHR and other human rights instruments.230
The office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, also, refers to the numerous UN
studies that have been carried out and have discussed the issue of legality of such measures from
a human rights perspective.231 Among those reports are: the background paper prepared by
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OHCHR on September 2000, that investigated the human rights impacts of sanctions on Iraq;232
CESCR General Comment No. 8 adopted in 1997 that considered the relationship between
economic sanctions and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR),233 and the Working Paper
“the adverse consequences of economic sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights”.234 OHCHR
also, carried a “thematic study on the impact of UCM on the enjoyment of human rights” in 2012
that included recommendations aiming at terminating such actions.
All these report and studies confirm the existence of divergent and complex view around
this topic and stress the need to further examining the linkage between UCM and human rights.
Therefore, as a practical step to solve the issues and grievances within the international system,
the Human Rights Council created the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impacts
of UCM on the Enjoyment of Human Rights in order to ensure the existence of multilateralism,
mutual respect and the peaceful settlement of disputes.235 The mandate includes a number of key
responsibilities, including making guidelines and recommendations on ways and means to prevent,
minimize and redress the adverse impact of UCM on human rights, and also to make an overall
review of independent mechanisms to assess UCM in order to promote accountability. 236
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The term “Unilateral Coercive Measures” has almost the same definition in UN documents
as the term “sanctions”, discussed earlier in this chapter. They are mostly understood as
“economic, trade or other measures taken by one State outside the auspices of the UNSC to compel
a change of policy of another Sate".237 Examples of such measures include trade sanctions in the
form of embargoes and the interruption of financial and investment flows between sender and
target countries. More recently, so-called “smart” or “targeted” sanctions such as asset freezing,
and travel bans have been employed by individual states in order to influence persons who are
perceived to have political influence in another State.238

3.4.1. Economic Sanctions and Respect for ESCR: GC No. 8 (1997)
General Comment No.8 was issued in late 90s after the committee was informed about the
impact of the sanctions upon the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights in various cases
that involved state parties to the covenant.239 Given the frequent imposition of economic sanctions
at international and regional levels, General Comment No. 8 emphasized the full applicability of
provisions related to human rights (Articles 1, 55 and 56) in cases of imposition of sanctions.240
The committee examined the dramatic impacts of the sanctions on the rights enshrined in the
Covenant, and referred to a number of situations in which the unintended consequences of the
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coercive measures have violated multiple human rights including right to work, right to clean
water, right to health and free trade.241
Article 2, para 1 of the ICESCR obliges states to take steps to achieving progressively the
full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant by all appropriate means. Even if the
sanctioned country is not a state party to the Covenant, the same principles will be applied to
protect the rights and core contents protected by the Covenant and also to protect the vulnerable
groups.242Also, the imposition of sanctions shouldn’t lead to an excuse for the affected party to
“nullify or diminish the relevant obligation of that state party”.243
Thus, it is important for the imposing entity (whether it be the international community ,
an international or regional organization , or a state or group of states), to take fully into account
the recognition of economic, social and cultural human rights when designing sanction regimes.244
This requires an effective monitoring throughout the period that sanctions are enforced to make
sure economic, social and cultural rights are protected.245Also, any “disproportionate suffering
experienced by vulnerable groups within the targeted countries” must be repented through
international assistance and cooperation.246
All in all, the purpose of this General Comment is to draw attention to the economic, social
and cultural rights of inhabitants of sanctioned countries that should not be disregarded by virtue
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of any determination that their leaders have violated norms relating to international peace and
security. The provisions of the UN Charter and the General Principles of International Law must
be respected by international community in any situation, and this includes respecting the rights
of civilians in sanctioned countries: “...it is to insist that lawlessness of one kind should not be met
by lawlessness of another kind which pays no heed to the fundamental rights that underlie and give
legitimacy to any such collective action”.247

3.5. Negative Impacts of Sanctions on Businesses and Conflict in Compliance
The important point with regard to coercive measures is that they “are not simply directed
at states but at corporations and individuals within countries”.248 Smart or targeted sanctions , that
are designed to avoid or decrease the collateral damages caused by sanctions, oblige states to
implement sanctions against “individuals suspected of involvement in international terrorism and
other threats to security”.249 This could lead to a conflict , as White explains, between “the
obligations of the implementing state on the international plane and those found in the national
legal order (including existing human rights protections which may or may not be a product of
international obligations).”250
The UNSC sanction committee is the deciding organ regarding non-state actors and
individuals that ought to be sanctioned. The problem is that their meetings are held behind closed
doors and as a result they rarely provide any justification to the public, and on occasions even to
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the affected parties.251 Nevertheless, the committee could enhance the legitimacy and compliance
pull of its decision by holding closed-door meetings only when confidential matters are been
discussed.252
There are also a number of studies that confirm the drawbacks of economic sanctions on
business entities.253 They suggest “aggressive foreign policy can generate uncertainty that affects
actors’ attitudes toward economic risk, reducing consumption and demand for capital”.254
The basis for the argument that concludes “sanctions are costly for firms with commercial
interests in targeted states” could be founded on two simple assumptions.255 First, the limiting
nature of economic sanctions will result in a decrease in “commercial exchange between senders
and targets” in different forms such as “import restrictions, export restrictions, [and] partial
economic embargoes”.256 Also, the primary objective of firms, including corporations, limited
liability companies, partnerships and any other business entities is trying to profit from their
commercial exchanges, while sanctions practically threaten corporations’ revenue streams through
negatively impacting investment behavior.257 Due to this, as long as the sanctions are in place, the
companies have to decline to take any form of profitable commercial activities otherwise they will
lose money instead of earning money. Another important point that must be taken into
considerations is the effect of threats of sanctions and the actual imposition of sanctions. There is
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a wrong assumption that only “imposition is costly” and “threats are relatively costless”, while
studies suggest otherwise.258

3.6. Conclusion:
The final months of the World War II was followed by the emergence of the UN in order
to increase international peace and security. Sanctions were introduced to help maintaining the
peace and security as alternatives to military measures in response to violation of international law
or international moral norms. While the ultimate purpose of imposing sanctions is punishment for
the target state’s wrongdoing, the precise scope and the duration of sanctions, however, have not
been discussed neither by international treaties nor by others. Some, nevertheless, believe the
permissibility of economic sanctions is limited by non-derogable provisions of human rights and
international humanitarian law.259
All in all, the issue of implementation and mechanisms of implementations of sanctions in
international law is a sensitive matter that must be enhanced. Many, including Jeremy Farrall,
emphasize the mechanisms that are “free from state domination”.260 He, for example, refers to the
important role of (and use of) experts in monitoring, strengthening and improvement of sanctions
regimes and keeping this process away from state’s representatives’ political motivations. Some
also suggest that internal accountability mechanisms at the UN level should be accompanied by
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external mechanisms (including judicial ones) at the national and international level given the
severe harms that could be resulted from general or targeted sanctions.261
Furthermore, it was discussed that the imposition of sanctions in general and UCM in
particular, would threaten a number of rights and freedoms enshrined in IHRL treaties.262 But my
argument is not limited to coercive measures imposed unilaterally. Sanctions are often harmful,
even if imposed under Chapter VII by the UNSC. The argument is that UCM are more harmful in
comparison to UNSC sanctions and perhaps this is the reason why the Special Rapporteur has
mostly concentrated on adverse effects of UCM. Specifically, the Special Rapporteur underlines
the discriminating effects of all unilateral sanctions on the basis of the country of residence, or
nationality of the targeted populations. The impacts of wide-ranging embargoes in conjunction
with secondary sanctions and the consequent economic isolation of the individuals associated with
the target state is what amount to enormous discrimination based on nationality. A current example
of this is the UCM imposed on Iran by the US which have practically deprived Iranian people of
the opportunity of conducting normal business and other relations with foreign counterparts.
The adverse effects of sanctions upon innocent civilian populations and third States should
thus be minimized. The next chapter will analyze the impact of the UCM on business entities and
the issue of extra-jurisdictional and transnational sanctions.
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Chapter IV Business and Human Rights in the Context of Sanctions
4.1. Introduction
The previous chapters provided a comprehensive overview of the definition and purpose
of imposing sanctions on states, entities or individuals whether through UNSC resolutions or
unilaterally by states. As of today, the fully updated list of countries subject to UNSC sanction
measures contains a rather considerable number of countries.263 This list does not cover unilateral
sanctions imposed by the US or the EU. This significant increase in the number of active sanctions
when compared to the maximum of 8 sanctions regimes in the 1990s and 12 in the 2000s is by no
means a sign of effectiveness of this practice.264 In fact, as Kofi Annan the former Secretary
General of the UN explains, much academic research has identified that sanctions are of limited
effectiveness in coercing changes in behavior of target states. In particular, one study by Thomas
Biersteker of the Graduate Institute in Geneva shows that not only the success rate of sanctions is
as low as 22 percent, but also, they mostly result in a considerable increase in human rights
violations within targeted countries.265 This is apart from the counterproductive effect of sanctions
in, among others, controlling the black markets of prohibited goods or totally damaging the
targeted states industries and economy that will lead to hurting the civilians.266 In another study by
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Oxford University’s Adam Roberts, sanctions are declared to be only slightly effective when
combined with other factors.267 Not even the use of targeted sanctions instead of comprehensive
ones as discussed in the previous chapter has rendered any obvious change in this trend and as
Professor John Ruggie has stated “sanctions are an instrument of coercive diplomacy except that
policy makers have forgotten about the policy part”.268
A wide range of human rights are impacted by the imposition of sanctions. This includes
various economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights. But mostly, it is
the detrimental effects of “economic sanctions” that have extensive severe impacts on many human
rights predominantly through discouraging of trade and investment in the target state.269 This
discouragement mainly occurs through the “isolation of repressive regimes from the international
community”, as a consequence preventing the target state from “economic integration through
trade and foreign investment” that is considered to be a crucial factor by many in “the promotion
of governmental respect for human rights”.270 Thus, as Peksen suggests, the unilateral economic
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coercion will ultimately result in worsened human rights practices in sanctioned countries while
the multilateral sanctions may even cause more harm to human rights conditions.271
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the impact of coercive measures in general and
unilateral economic sanctions in particular on international normative BHR standards, notably the
UNGPs and OECD MNE Guidelines, in order to assess whether the sanctions regimes are in
conflict with these BHR instruments. In order to do so, an overview of the UN and OECD BHR
instruments will be provided (this will be discussed in the current and the next chapter
respectively), to determine whether sanctions have been considered within these instruments and
mechanisms. This will be followed by an investigation of whether the state duty to protect human
rights as found in the UNGPs is relevant when a home state imposes sanctions either on its own
companies operating internationally, or on other TNCs, and whether the corporation can comply
with its responsibility to respect human rights in light of these sanctions.

4.2. Business and Human Rights
The field of BHR is about “preventing and addressing human rights violations by the
business sector”.272 A number of soft law initiatives on BHR exist that have been promoted by
international authoritative sources such as the UN or the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and includes the UN Global Compact273 that was launched by Kofi
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Annan in 2000, the UNGPs274 and also the human rights chapter in the OECD MNE Guidelines,275
that was added in 2011 in order to fully align the work of the OECD with the UNGPs.276 These
normative standards are clear benchmarks for businesses to re-evaluate “their conformity to the
international human rights legal regime” especially with regards to their transnational business
activities and also for states to promote BHR, with a clear requirement that businesses identify,
prevent, address and mitigate potential and actual human rights violations.277 In the following
section, the two fundamental normative standards, the UNGPs and OECD MNE Guidelines will
be discussed in more details.
The central questions for my thesis are whether the state duty to protect human rights as
clarified in the UNGPs is relevant when a home state imposes sanctions either on its own
companies operating internationally, or on other TNCs, and whether the corporation can comply
with its own responsibility to respect human rights in light of the sanctions. Due to the importance
of defining the state duty to protect human rights and the business responsibility to respect human
rights, I will first focus on the UNGPs.
In June 2011, the UN Human Rights Council unanimously endorsed the UNGPs, and they
have remained the only guidance issued by the Council for states and business enterprises on their
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respective obligations in relation to BHR.278 The UNGPs are described as “the global authoritative
standard, providing a blueprint for the steps all states and businesses should take to uphold human
rights.”279 by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
The UNGPs are not in themselves legally binding but “derive their normative force through
their endorsement by states and support from other stakeholders and businesses itself”.280 They are
comprised of 31 principles and encompass “all internationally recognized rights and apply to all
states and all business enterprises”.281 The three pillars that frame the UNGPs are Protect, Respect
and Remedy and were developed by John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the Secretary
General (SRSG). The framework was requested by the UN Commission on Human Rights’
adoption of the resolution E/CN.4/RES/2005/69 seeking to identify and clarify standards of
corporate responsibility and accountability for transnational corporations and other business
enterprises with regard to human rights.282
Ruggie himself considers the three pillars of the Protect, Respect and Remedy framework
as interrelated.283An advantage of norms and standards over hard law, as Ruggie states, is that they
would “spread much faster and more widely than they would otherwise”.284 However, while the
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UNGPs may not be binding, the state duty reflects existing binding international law as stated by
the UNGPs themselves:
“Nothing in these Guiding Principles should be read as creating new international law
obligations, or as limiting or undermining any legal obligations a State may have
undertaken or be subject to under international law with regard to human rights.”285
It is noteworthy that before the UNGPs were introduced in 2011, the UN had been actively
engaged in addressing corporate conduct through another UN initiative in 1999 when Kofi Annan
introduced the Global Compact in order to “promote business support for UN norms in the area of
human rights, labour standards and the environment” by reflecting a broadly “social constructivist
approach”.286 Ruggie contributed to that process as well.

4.2.1. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: The Principles
The UNGPs apply to all countries and business enterprises including TNCs and others, and
are designed to enhance standards and practices with regard to BHR in order to have a “socially
sustainable globalization” by “achieving tangible results for affected individuals and
communities”.287 To achieve this aim, these principles have to be considered both individually and
collectively and must be implemented “in a non-discriminatory manner”.288 The state duty to
protect against human rights abuses by business enterprises, the corporate responsibility to respect
human rights and the need for greater access to effective remedies by victims are recognized to be
the three “differentiated but complementary responsibilities” that ground the UNGPs.289
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In order to facilitate implementation of the UNGPs, the UN Human Rights Council
appointed a working group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other
business enterprises in 2011. The working group also makes recommendations and provides
support for the use of the UNGPs, as well as enhancing access to effective remedies for victims of
corporate activities, including those in conflict areas.290

4.2.1.1 First Pillar: State Duty to Protect Human Rights
In this section, an attempt will be made to unpack the state duty to protect based on the first
pillar of the UNGPs that focuses on preventive measures, together with the third pillar that outlines
remedial measures. Consisting of 10 sub-principles, the first pillar provides requirements and
explanation for the effective protection of human rights by states. In other words, these principles
break down what exactly needs to be done by states to protect individuals against human rights
abuses by third actors (including businesses) through efficient policies, regulations, legislation and
adjudication.291 The first pillar is described as “a smart mix of measures- national and international,
mandatory and voluntary” to make the state duty to protect effective.292 The failure of the state to
“enable and maintain such a mix” is often related to the “legal gap in the state governance” as
explained by the UNGPs.293
The governance gap that allows for the continued impunity of TNCs involved in or
benefiting from human rights violations is discussed at length by Simons and Macklin through an
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evaluation of the UN Global Compact, the OECD MNE Guidelines and also the UNGPs.294
Interestingly, while the authors highlight the ability of home states to closing the governance gap
by regulating the TNCs, they do not consider it an adequate response and argue that “a multipronged approached” in various jurisdictional levels is needed to tackle this issue.295
The state duty to protect defined by Pillar 1 of the UNGPs is a reflection of the “traditional
role of states in safeguarding individuals’ human rights against abuses committed by non-state
actors (NSAs)”.296 The human rights obligation of states with regard to business activities, includes
ensuring that businesses do not indirectly infringe upon human rights. However, in case any state
fails to protect individuals against human rights related abuses due to its inability or unwillingness,
it would then be the responsibility of the home state (in the case of transnational business activities)
or the business enterprise itself to take necessary measures.297
The state obligation to protect “lies at the very core of the international human rights
regime.”298 Stephanie Lagoutte argues that “the UNGPs do not create new international law
obligations, but reiterate two pre-existing international human rights law obligations” mainly
through Guiding Principles 1 and 25 (Guiding Principle 25 which focuses on access to remedy
will be discussed in detail below).299
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The first two principles of the first pillar explain the foundational principles of the state
duty to protect and are rooted in fundamental norms of international human rights law that demand
states “respect, protect and fulfill their human rights obligations” regarding every single individual
within their territory or jurisdiction.300 Ever since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights301 in 1948, the first Guiding Principle has been widely reflected in almost all
international treaties or guidelines, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights302 and its sister covenant, on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.303 The commentary
section of the first principle further explains that the state duty to protect is a “standard of conduct”
and also covers human rights abuses committed by third parties, including business enterprises.
While the state is considered to be the main duty holder in international law, the violation of human
rights resulting from actions of the private actors cannot necessarily be attributed to them, although
states breach their own international human rights law obligations by failing to take “appropriate
steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress private actors’ abuse”.304 Furthermore, this part
also highlights the state duty to “protect and promote the rule of law” by taking measures to “ensure
equality before the law, fairness in its application, and by providing for adequate accountability,
legal certainty, and procedural and legal transparency”.305
Lagoutte refers to the already well-established case law of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) to better illustrate how the nature and content of the state positive and negative
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obligations in the field of BHR have been exemplified. Similarly, she mentions to the work of the
Inter-American Court and Commission for Human rights based on Articles 1.1 and 2 of the
American Convention on Human Rights306 that discuss the overall obligation of states to act with
due diligence to prevent human rights violations resulting from the activities the non-state actors
including business enterprises.307
As discussed, many human rights treaty bodies are participating in defining the state duty
to protect in the field of BHR.308 However, apart from the hard law, a series of reports on behalf
of the SRSG also mapped “the obligations of states to regulate and adjudicate corporate activities
under the UN core human rights treaties”.309 In one report, for instance, a trend towards increasing
pressure on states to fulfil their duty to protect in relation to corporate activities is identified.310
Likewise, the UNGPs underline the particular attention that has to be placed on states that take a
narrow approach to their duty to protect and require states to adopt a corporate culture respectful
of human rights domestically and internationally to meet their duty to protect.311
Guiding principle 2 encompasses various approaches adopted by states to ensure all
businesses domiciled in their territory or jurisdiction respect human rights while operating.312 As
explained by commentary to Principle 2, these approaches include “domestic measures with
extraterritorial implications and direct extraterritorial legislations and enforcement”.313
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Guiding Principles 3 to 10 are operational principles that elaborate on Principle 1 and 2.
Guiding Principle 3 specifies a number of criteria for states’ compliance with their duty to
protect.314 These include the enforcement of laws that require businesses to respect human rights
by enabling them instead of constraining them, providing effective guidance on the responsibility
to respect, and requiring them to prepare impact assessments.315 Thus, while Principle 3 refers to
“general state regulatory and policy functions” by emphasizing the enforcement and assessment
of existing laws, Principles 4-6 covers “the state-business nexus” and the additional steps that
states must take in order to protect individuals specifically against state-owned enterprises.316
These extra measures include requiring human rights due diligence to meet their international
human rights obligations that is of great importance in the context of sanctions as well.317 Relevant
to the topic of this thesis and the explanation that sanctioned countries should be considered as
high-risk areas (rather similar to conflict-affected areas), Guiding Principle 7 elaborates on the
heightened risk of “gross human rights violations” in conflict-affected areas and the possible
inability of host state to “protect human rights adequately due to lack of effective control”.318 The
role of home state in ensuring that businesses are not involved in human rights abuse in such
situation is reiterated by this principle and its commentary.319
The last three Principles of Pillar 1 address “ensuring policy coherence” through taking a broad
approach in managing the BHR agenda by states, as explained in Guiding Principle 8. This
approach includes having laws and policies in place in line with their international human rights
law obligations while “supporting and equipping” their national and subnational departments to
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“act in a manner compatible” with state’s human rights obligations.320 Additionally, the
importance of cooperation among states, as members of multilateral institutions, is highlighted in
Principle 10 that refers to business-related policy coherence at international level. Such
international cooperation and the resulting collective action can assist states as members of the
international community to fulfil their duty to protect in a more effective way.321
Subsection (c) of Principle 10 highlights the importance of the promotion of “International
Cooperation” along with state duty to protect.322 However, what the UNGPs fail to mention are
the factors that influence this cooperation. For example, the geopolitical situation of developing
states, conflict affected areas, or the presence of sanctions appear to be factors that would
negatively affect the ability of states in order to establish an independent and effective duty to
protect. It is troubling that despite the emphasis on the problematic governance gap in BHR, the
UNGPs fail to bridge a main part of this gap, by ignoring critical issues such as sanctions.
Despite wide endorsement of the UNGPs and the protect principles, the aims set within the
framework have not been fully achieved yet. Some argue that the unwillingness and incapability
of states to pass and enforce laws to protect human rights is a result of the continuing governance
gap that was identified by Ruggie and the UNGPs.323 Others suggest that it is rather naive to
suggest that countries will find the resources or be encouraged by the UN members with “no
compulsory, legally enforceable provisions to force companies to comply”.324
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Nevertheless, in order to depict a practical approach to implementing the protect principles,
some refer to the adoption of the new law in France in February 2017, that requires human rights
due diligence by large French companies in their operations and supply chain.325 This approach
was welcomed by the OHCHR and the Working Group referred to the important role of
parliamentarians in adopting new legislation aimed to implement the state duty to protect human
rights in a business context.326
In general, the obligation to protect against human rights abuses by third parties implies a
substantive obligation to ensure human rights protection through legislation in order to ensure the
protection of vulnerable groups or individuals; a procedural obligation to investigate, punish and
redress potential human rights abuses; and an obligation to inform about and monitor high-risk
activities (extractive industries, chemical industries).327 In the context of sanctions, not only all
these steps seem absolutely necessary to protect rights of individuals residing within the sanctioned
territory, but also extra steps must be taken to ensure the comprehensive implementation of the
state duty to protect human rights.
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4.2.1.2 Third Pillar: Access to Remedy
Principles 25-31 of the UNGPs scrutinize remedial measures that states must undertake to
ensure those affected have access to effective remedy in case of violation of human rights resulting
from business activities. Guiding Principle 31 refers to a number of criteria that provide a
benchmark for designing, revising and assessing a non-judicial grievance mechanism in order to
ensure its effectiveness. These criteria include legitimacy, accessibility, predictability, equitability,
transparency, rights-compatibility, continuous learning and engagement in dialogue.328
In case of occurrence of business-related human rights abuses, Principle 25 clarifies that
taking appropriate measures to investigate, punish, and redress those violations is a part of the state
duty to protect that has both procedural and substantive aspects.329 The states’ obligation to provide
all potential victims access to remedy for human rights abuses is extensively discussed in
international human rights law and Principle 25 restates this obligation.330 For example, Article 8
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that everyone has the right to an effective
remedy for acts violating the fundamental rights granted by law. The accessibility and
effectiveness of the both state-based and non-state-based mechanisms is further elaborated on
Guiding Principles 26-28 through a wide range of remedies at its disposal.
In order to address the practical and legal challenges faced by victims of human rights
abuses by business enterprises to access remedy, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) launched the Accountability and Remedy Project in 2014.331 This project has
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received multiple mandates so far, and aims to contribute to the development of more effective
and fairer state-based and non-state-based remedy mechanisms (including non-state-based
grievance mechanisms and state-based non-judicial mechanisms) to address human rights
violationss resulting from the involvement of businesses.332
Similarly, Guiding Principle 26 that covers state-based judicial mechanisms, explains that
states must ensure that no legal barrier prevents legitimate cases from being brought before
courts.333 These barriers might exist at the domestic level and could be related to the “attribution
of criminal or civil liability to business enterprises”.334 Lifting these barriers may require states to
fundamentally change some parts of their domestic legislation.335 This is apart from the existing
adaptations among different domestic jurisdiction that could in part lead to actual impunity for
businesses due to legal uncertainty.336 As Zerk argues, states have to start taking into consideration
and possibly harmonising the great range of issues and elements of civil and criminal liability
relevant to business operations.337
As a supplement to judicial mechanisms, “state-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms”
are introduced by Guiding Principle 27 mainly to fill in the remedial gaps of the business-related
human rights violations where judicial remedy is either ineffective or insufficient. This is followed
by Principles 28-30 that describe “non-state-based grievance mechanisms” that are administrated
by the business itself, the stakeholders, an industry association or a multi-stakeholder group.338
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Finally, the jurisdictional questions that arise with regard to the home state duty to protect
and access to remedy through the exercise of transnational jurisdiction is a critical issue that is
touched on in the commentaries of the UNGPs as well as the OHCHR Accountability and Remedy
Project.339

4.2.1.3 Second Pillar: The Business Responsibility to Respect Human Rights
According to the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework, while states have a duty to
protect against human rights abuses by third parties through ensuring non-infringement on human
rights of others, corporations have the responsibility to respect human rights through “managing
the risk of harm and by trying to avoid harm”.340 The framework also highlights that the corporate
responsibility to respect has been reaffirmed in many international human rights instruments
including the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR and also ILO Declaration341 on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work.342 Thus, the second pillar is grounded on the belief that corporations have a
responsibility to conform to international standards.343 Nevertheless, the OHCHR interprets that
the purpose of Guiding Principles is to “take these standards one step further and apply them
globally to all businesses in all situations, making it exist independently of an enterprise’s own
commitment to human rights”.344
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The second pillar encompasses principles 11-25, and elaborates the contents of the
independent responsibility of business entities to respect human rights as a global standard. The
UNGPs explicitly declare that the business responsibility to respect human rights “exists over and
above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human rights”.345 This has also
been made clear by leading business associations and the International Chamber of Commerce, by
stating that the standards identified in the second pillar exist “even if national laws are poorly
enforced or not at all”.346 According to Guiding Principle 13, in order to respect human rights
throughout their entire operation, businesses should take adequate measures to prevent, mitigate
and when required, provide remediation. A number of scholars argue that business entities should
take advantage of their sphere of influence in order to increase Corporate Social Responsibility
because where there is power, there is accountability and the businesses owe the greatest duties
to their circle of contact, including workers, consumers, and member of local communities.347
Nevertheless, involvement of an enterprise in an alleged contribution to a human rights
violation or harm could be avoided if the business could prove they have taken every reasonable
step by “conducting appropriate human rights due diligence”.348 Yet, it should not be assumed that
conducting due diligence is solely sufficient to fully absolve the business enterprise from liability
for contributing to or causing human rights violations.349 Principle 13 of the UNGPs, also,
recommends business enterprises respect human rights by urging them to avoid any involvement
in activities that may result in causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts, and seek
to prevent and to mitigate any negative impact that is linked to their operations even if they have
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not contributed to those impacts.350 Principle 15 of the UNGPs proposes three mechanisms to
accomplish the above-mentioned requirements. These include a policy commitment to meet their
responsibility to respect, a human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and
account for how they address their impacts on human rights, and lastly enabling a remediation
process for any adverse human rights impacts they cause or to which they contribute.351
Principles 17-21 are related to the due-diligence mechanism. Guiding Principle 17 that
describes the parameters for human rights due diligence, obliges business enterprises to carry out
human rights due diligence to “identify, prevent, mitigate and account for” their adverse human
rights impacts.352 What is most relevant to the topic of this thesis, is the scope of due diligence
process that not only includes assessment of the actual human rights impacts, but also the potential
impacts. In the context of sanctions, some human rights violations might appear over the time or
potentially. Thus, the wording of the UNGPs in this principle is remarkably useful to justify the
extra measures that must be taken in sanctioned states.
Principles 18 through 21 elaborate the essential components of the due diligence
mechanism.353 While Principle 18 describes identification and assessment of the “nature of the
actual and potential adverse human rights impacts with which a business may be involved” as the
initial steps in conducting due diligence, Principle 19 clarifies that in order for the human rights
impact assessments to be effective, businesses should incorporate their human rights policy
commitments into all their relevant functions.354 It must be emphasized, again, that both actual and
potential adverse impacts must be considered when assessing human rights impacts by
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enterprises.355 This is also reflected in the last two principles of pillar two, Principles 23 and 24
prior to which the issue of remediation for the actual -not potential- adverse human rights impacts
of the businesses’ activities is covered by Principle 22.
The due diligence mechanism has invited some criticisms. For instance, Vincent Chetail
considers the regime of due diligence to be the most solid method to oblige businesses to the rules
of international law but he also criticizes the UNGPs as being too ambiguous.356 Bonnitcha put
forwards the same argument and even though he considers constructive ambiguity a “useful tool
in building consensus on contested issue”, he emphasizes the difference between the legal and
business meaning of due diligence that could create conceptual confusion about the scope of
corporate responsibility to respect human rights.357

4.3. Exterritoriality, Transnationality, and The State Duty to Protect
This part explores the nature of extraterritorial and transnational state obligation and the
significance of such differentiation. This will be followed by further investigating states
extraterritorial obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights in 2017 General Comment
No.24. Later, the home state duty to protect in the context of unilateral sanctions (where the home
state is not the targeting state and host state is unable to protect human rights) will be discussed to
realize how TNCs respect human rights of the individuals residing in the targeted state. The
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similarities between conflict-affected or high-risk areas with sanctioned country will help to pave
the way for this discussion.

4.3.1. Extraterritorial vs Transnational Jurisdiction and Obligation in BHR
For the purpose of this thesis and in order to remain as precise as possible in the context of
business human rights, I will be cautious in use of the world “extraterritorial”. As Sara Seck
explains: “Extraterritorial is not only difficult to define but is often associated with notions of
illegality”.358
To exemplify, if Canada is regulating a Canadian-based company in relation to what it is
doing in Iran, it will be described here as transnational regulation. But if the US is passing a law
that requires Canadian companies operating in Iran to comply with it, then this will be described
as extraterritorial regulation. The focus of the research in this thesis will be on both extraterritorial
and transnational regulation, with an emphasis on the importance of transnational application of
domestic laws in the context of extraterritorial sanctions.
Seck argues that unsuccessful transnational human rights corporate accountability
litigation could reinforce the sense that “corporate violations of human right can evade justice and
leave victims without effective remedy”.359 She further discusses that “the promise of the UNGPs
and the premise of the Global Compact” have proven that states are not the only “regulators of
public goods” and todays globalized world requires a “polycentric mode of governance” that
“preserves a key role for the state in accordance with international law, yet also embrace a social
responsibility of non-state private transnational business actors, and the key watchdog
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contributions of non-state transnational civil society actors”.360 This is exactly the case in sanctions
context; polycentric governance could fill in the existing gap in the business human rights
materials to some extent. Where states can’t uphold their duties, businesses respect their
responsibility to protect and civil society actors could get involved when neither of those two are
upholding their commitments.
Seck refers to the movement of exercising extraterritorial (transnational) jurisdiction that
started with “concerns over the negative impacts of transnational corporate conduct” and endorsed
the extended extraterritorial obligations of states, despite “their territorially bounded nature”.361
She believes that the terminology of “extraterritorial jurisdiction and extraterritorial obligations”
commonly used in the BHR context, places too much emphasis on the “territoriality bounded
sovereign state” while undermining “the reality of our ecological interdependence”.362 She further
reiterates this perception by referring to Mark Gibney’s thoughts and his suggestion that instead
of focusing on the extraterritorial terminology, it is more meaningful to emphasize on the term
“human rights”. This term conveys the understanding that “all people have human rights and all
states have the responsibility to protect those rights-for all people.”363
Unpacking the difference between the two foundational principles of the UNGPs, Guiding
Principle 1 and Guiding Principle 2, is of great importance to the distinction between
transnationality and extraterritoriality.364 The jurisdictional scope of the state duty to protect, is
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highly contested, even though states are required by international law, “to protect against human
rights abuses by businesses affecting persons within their territory or jurisdiction”.365 Nevertheless,
while Guiding Principle 2 is often associated with home state regulation, Guiding Principle1
should also be understood as including home state transnational regulation (when it is read together
with Principle 25 on access to remedy).366 Other than Principle 1, 2 and 25, the issue of home state
jurisdiction is also discussed in Principle 7 on conflict affected areas, as it considers the home
state’s role central in ensuring the non-involvement of TNCs in human rights violations while host
states lacks effective control.367

4.3.2. UNGPs and Conflict-affected Areas
The UNGPs provide detailed guidance for states and business entities on how to prevent,
address and redress business related human rights harms. Given this, an attempt will be made to
investigate whether or not the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties
including businesses, as it is defined by UNGPs, is relevant when a state imposes sanctions on its
own companies operating internationally (transnational sanctions) and also extraterritorially on
other corporations with home states based in other jurisdictions.
Except for the reference in Principle 7 to businesses human rights violations in conflictaffected areas, there is no explicit consideration in the UNGPs to situations where sanctions may
be imposed. This includes UNSC sanctions imposed based on chapter VII, or UCM imposed by
individual states. It has been reiterated by scholars that the reason Ruggie discussed the particular
issue of conflict-affected areas during the development of the UNGPs was probably due to the
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significant “governance gap” existing at the international level and the rather acute challenges
resulted from this gap in conflicted areas.368 The same justification should exists in the context of
sanctions regimes. There is an obvious and harmful “governance gap” when it comes to the home
state duty to protect where sanctions are in place but the BHR instruments and UNGPs in particular
fail to recognize it.
As discussed, when it comes to the first pillar and the state duty to protect, the UNGPs do
not “articulate new legal obligations” and they are intended to place particular stress “on the need
for greater policy coherence between states’ human rights obligations and their regulatory and
other actions with respect to business”.369 This is because they mostly spell out the policy
implications of states’ existing duties under international human rights law when it comes to
protecting against business-related human rights harms.370 Thus, given the content of the first pillar
of the UN framework, states should create a conductive environment by fostering and developing
business respect for human rights at home and abroad, which includes where there is a statebusiness nexus.371
Also, Guiding Principle 7 on the state duty to protect in conflict affected areas, argues that
since the risk of gross human rights abuses is heightened in such areas, states hold the duty to
ensure that any business entity operating in those contexts is not involved with such abuses. Later,
this Principle proposes a number of measures states should take to identify, prevent and mitigate
the human rights risks associated with their operations. This raises the question of whether it would
be fundamentally wrong to compare a conflict situation with a situation where sanctions are being
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imposed unilaterally by states on companies? If this is the case, the same rule should be applied in
the context of target states where sanctions are being imposed on by foreign states, who should
take the required steps to protects individuals from potential indirect and direct abuses.
In an addenda to the UNGPs that reports on a workshop on conflict-affected areas, it is
argued that the gravity of widespread business-related human rights abuses that occur in conflict
zones requires states to take action as a matter of urgency since the IHR regime cannot be expected
to function as intended in such situations.372 However, the lack of clarity among states as to “what
innovative, proactive and, above all, practical policies and tools have the greatest potential for
preventing or mitigating business-related abuses in situations of conflict” prevent them from taking
effective measures.373 In fact, the lack of reference to the context of sanctions is also of concern
and causes a lot of chaos since both states and companies are not provided with any BHR guidance
on how to behave.
In one of his early notes on BHR in conflict affected areas, Ruggie discussed that it is
important to address not “actual conflicts but hypothetical scenarios that draw out typical or
emblematic challenges confronting businesses when they operate in conflict zones”. 374 He
indicated that it is important to “explore a wide range of policy approaches and tools” that states
can and should do in responding to “actual and potential human rights harms” caused by corporate
actors in the context of each scenario.375 I believe the same argument can be used in the context of
sanctions. Whether a country is under UN sanctions regimes or a set of unilateral sanctions by
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another states, the international community including states, TNCs, academia and civil society
should evaluate the actual and potential harms of sanctions on innocent individuals and
environment to mitigate the enormous negative impacts of coercive measures to the greatest
possible extent.
To support this argument, we could refer to Guiding Principle 7 that covers supporting
business respect for human rights in conflict-affected areas and the commentary to Guiding
Principle 23 on issues of contexts that singles out conflict affected areas as “an operating
environment that may increase the risks of enterprises being complicit in gross human rights
abuses committed by other actors”.376 Therefore, the legal compliance raised from the risk of
causing or contributing to human rights violations as a result of operating in a complex context
(such as a conflict-affected area or a sanctioned country), must be taken seriously. Similarly, other
instruments such as OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas377 and its Supplement on Gold and the UN Global
Compact Guidance on Responsible Business in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas378 also
highlight the heightened risk for corporations operate in such context.379 Conflict-affected areas
are known to requires special due diligence process that would help the businesses to support their
efforts to implement the UNGPs. It could be argued that sanctioned countries are also among the
high-risk areas that also require special due diligence on business and state end.
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In order to ensure the effective implementation of the UNGPs clarifying the human rights
responsibilities of businesses, OHCHR published the Interpretive Guide in full collaboration with
the former Special Representative, Mr. John Ruggie.380 This guide is meant to provide “additional
background explanation to the Guiding Principles to support a full understanding of their meaning
and intent”.381 To be able to find an answer to the question of compliance of corporations when
the home state is imposing sanctions transnationally, or when a third state imposes extraterritorial
sanctions, I referred to this interpretive guideline after realizing that similar to the first and third
pillar, the second pillar of the UNGPs also has no refence to sanctions regimes and their effect on
the operation of business entities, let alone to the situation where home state is imposing
transnational and extraterritorial sanctions on target states. However, no solution or even reference
to sanctions was found in the interpretive guide either and the question of enforcement and
compliance in the context of sanctions remains unanswered.
As explained in earlier chapters, a common reason for imposition of sanctions is declared
to be the threatening wrongdoings of the target state that has resulted in violation of international
norms. If the coercive measures lead to violation of human rights of citizens of the sanctioned state
by restricting trade, placing embargos or cutting the TNCs from operating with or in the targeted
states, then the actions of the targeting state is definitely in contrast with international law and
international human rights norms. Every individual, apart from their nationality, must be able to
equally enjoy human rights and should not be punished for wrongful acts of their origin country.
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4.3.3. General Comment No. 24
In 2011, in reaction to the growing impact of business activities on the enjoyment of specific
covenant rights, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in its 46th
session, adopted a statement on “the obligations of States parties regarding the corporate sector
and economic, social and cultural rights”.382 The statement highlights “the state obligation to
respect, protect and fulfil the covenant rights of all persons under their jurisdiction in the context
of corporate activities undertaken by state-owned or private enterprises” based on article 2(1) of
the ICESCR.383 This article defines “the nature of the obligations of the state parties” and refers to
necessary implementation measures including legislative, administrative, financial, educational
and social measures along with domestic and global needs assessments.384
To complement the previous contribution, in August 2017 the CESCR released its General
Comment No. 24 on state obligations under the ICESCR in the context of business activities.385
This document is considered to be “the most impactful document released by CESCR” mainly due
to the fact that it “elaborates on the role of the ICESCR as a legal constraint on state regulation of
business

activities,

especially

in

the

area

of

investment

treaty

making”.386

Rapporteurs Olivier De Schutter and Zdzislaw Kedzia prepared the first draft of the General
Comment that was followed by several discussions and written contributions by different
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stakeholders and states.387 Regardless of whether the business entity operates nationally or
transnationally or whether it is state-owned or privately-owned, and regardless of its size, sector
and location, the General Comment applies to all business activities equally.388
Undoubtedly, one of the most relevant parts of the General Comment is the section on
obligation to protect. The CESCR definition of this obligation requires states to take necessary
measures to prevent third parties from interfering with the enjoyment of individuals’ rights. The
Maastricht Guidelines on violations of economic, social and cultural rights (1997)389, similarly,
affirms that “the obligation to protect requires states to prevent violations of such rights by third
parties”.390 In this regard, it is of utmost importance to clarify that states could be also responsible
“to the extent its organs have been made possible the violations, by omitting to adopt the necessary
measures to prevent the violations”.391 As De Shutter explains: “the State must accept
responsibility not only for the acts its organs have adopted […], but also for the omissions of these
organs, in situations where such omissions result in an insufficient protection of private persons
whose rights or freedoms are violated by the acts of other non-State actors.”392
Clarifying the dual content of the state duty to protect is also of great importance: an ex-ante
and ex-poste nature or the obligation to prevent violations of private actors and the obligation to
assure the victim access to an effective remedy in the event of a violation.393 It is also noted by
some human rights bodies that the obligation to protect “must be defined according to the due

387

Marcella Ferri, “The General Comment No. 24 on State Obligations Under the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of business activities” (2017) 3:1 Federalismi, Focus Human
Rights 1, at 5 para 3.
388
General Comment No.24, supra note 385, at para 3.
389
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (26 January 1997), at para 6.
390
Ferri, supra note 387 at 8 para 2.
391
Ibid at 9 para 1.
392
Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary, 2nd ed (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014) 441.
393
Ferri, supra note 387 at 10 para 2.

78

diligence principle”.394 For example, the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, affirms that “states are responsible for violations arising from their lack of
due diligence in monitoring the non-state actors’ behavior”.395
General Comment 24 defines “states extraterritorial obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil
the covenant rights” and also the types of remedies and measures of implementation.396 While the
General Comment uses the language of both extraterritoriality and transnationality, it does not
distinguish between transnational jurisdiction and extraterritorial jurisdiction. Previously, the
Committee in its 2011 statement reiterated that the obligations of the ICESCR state parties do not
stop at their territorial borders.397 In other words, the required steps must be taken by states to
prevent human rights violations abroad by corporations domiciled in their territory or jurisdiction:
“whether they are incorporated under their laws, or have their statutory seat, central administration
or principal place of business on the national territory, without infringing the sovereignty or
diminishing the obligations of the host States under the Covenant”.398 Prior to this, specific
extraterritorial obligations of state parties concerning business activities have been also addressed
by General Comments relating to the right to water,399 the right to work,400 the right to social
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security,401 the right to just and favorable conditions of work,402 as well as in its examination of
States' periodic reports.
In the context of sanctions, General Comment No. 8 regarding “the relationship between
economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural rights” also refers to the
extraterritorial obligation to respect that requires state parties to refrain from interfering directly
or indirectly with the enjoyment of the Covenant rights by persons outside their territories. This
obligation also requires states parties to ensure that they do not “obstruct another state from
complying with its obligations under the Covenant”.403 General Comment No.24 touches upon the
issue of sanctions by referring to the General Comment No.8 by reiterating that as part of the
extraterritorial obligation to respect, state must refrain from obstructing another state’s compliance
with its treaty obligations.404Additionally, it refers to Article 50 of Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts405 that also underlines the state
obligation to respect by asserting that countermeasures by a state or group of states in response to
an internationally wrongful act by another state may not affect obligations for the protection of
fundamental human rights.406
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The 2017 General Comment No.24, all in all, is believed to be deeply influenced by and
reflective of UNGPs.407 The clear recognition of states’ transnational human rights obligations is
also considered to be innovative and revolutionary even though the strong opposition expressed
by some states over the course of the General Comment discussions and the open-ended
intergovernmental working group reveals states’ reluctance to “recognize the extraterritorial
dimension of their human rights obligations”.408 The General Comment contributes to a growing
acknowledgement of the rights abuses that arise from business activities and the need to protect
against those violations.

4.3.3.1. Home State, Host State and Extra-jurisdictional Sanctions
In the context of unilateral sanctions, since the targeting state imposes and enforces them
unilaterally, the home state (where the home state is not the targeting state) is responsible to ensure
that TNCs respect human rights of the individuals residing in targeted state at all costs.409 Where
there is doubt with regard to the home state nationality, Seck explains that “determining corporate
nationality is a state practice but that state practice diverges, with common law countries tending
to accord nationality on the basis of incorporation within their territory regardless of where the
business management is carried out, while civil law countries confer nationality on the basis of
where the company has its seat of management.”410
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Thus, TNCs are obliged to respect human rights and the UN has acknowledged the “nexus and
necessity of engaging business in the task of protecting human rights” in the UNSC sanctions
context.411 In the context of extraterritorial sanctions that are unilateral and imposed on the target
state by the targeting country, the issue is more complex. Seck explains “while a state may apply
its law directly to a corporate national with a branch or office in another state, it may not as a rule
(under doctrines of international law) apply its law directly to a foreign affiliate set up as a separate
legal entity under the laws of the host state.”412
If applying domestic regulations -in this case unilateral economic sanctions- to corporation
with different nationalities as that of home state is not allowed under the principles of international
law, then how come in reality this happens and what could be done by the home state to prevent
this? Perhaps incorporating policies and laws covering this issue at the national level could pave
the way for a further step at the international level.

4.3.3.2. Extraterritoriality and Transnationality in the Context of UCM on TNCs
Among the few instances where sanctions with extraterritorial effects have actually
received consideration in international law, one could refer to reports of the Special Rapporteur on
the negative impacts of the UCM on human rights. For example, his Oct 2017 report to the General
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Assembly, is concentrated on the issue of extraterritoriality in relation to UCM. The Special
Rapporteur does not explicitly differentiate between exterritorial and transnational sanctions and
he uses the term extraterritorial to talk about both. He does, however, distinguish “the issue of
extraterritorial sanctions in the meaning of extraterritorial enforcement of domestic sanctions
measures” and “the issue of extraterritoriality of human rights obligations, which refers to the
existence and extent of extraterritorial obligations of targeting States under human rights law.”413
Based on this, he identifies extraterritorial sanctions as unlawful under international law.414 This
insight towards extraterritorial sanctions and their unlawfulness under international law, has been
also displayed in some UN body resolutions and has been embraced by a great number of states
and by regional organizations,415 and is particularly coming to fore in developments concerning
UCM targeting the Russian Federation or Iran.416
The Special Rapporteur, however, does not discuss transnational sanctions in his reports.
When a home state imposes sanctions transnationally on his own companies abroad, the host state
could still bear economic or social damages leading to certain human rights violations. Thus, even
though the state duty to protect as explained in the UNGPs requires states to ensure TNCs
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domiciled in their jurisdiction respect human rights, the sanctions set up by home state could negate
their duty to protect.417
Extraterritorial sanctions and the human rights accountability of the targeting state for
harms caused abroad by their sanctions is the critical issue that has been investigated by the Special
Rapporteur. He calls for “a clear recognition of both the obligations and the accountability
incumbent upon targeting states”418 since the recent jurisprudence of international courts and
tribunals features recent cases where human rights treaties have been found applicable
“irrespective of a finding of jurisdiction or control stricto sensu in situations where a state’s actions
had entailed consequences abroad.”419 This is precisely the case for targets of unilateral sanctions
and as also emphasized by ESCR General Comment No. 8, the targeting state remains responsible
to protect individuals within the target state’s territory to the best of its ability.420

4.4. Conclusion
In this core chapter of the thesis, I investigated some BHR instruments, with a focus on the
UNGPs, to discover whether sanctions have received attention. This was followed by discussing
the issue of transnationality and extraterritoriality and the home state duty in the context of
sanctions. The distinction between transnational and extraterritorial was maintained throughout
this chapter. The main focus remained on the existing gap in BHR international normative
standards, UNGPs and OECD Guidelines that will be discussed in the next chapter.
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The reason why transnationality was discussed is due to the pre-existence of such
transnational relationship between the home state and host state. In sanction’s context two
scenarios exist: First, the situation where the home state is also the targeting state and second the
situation in which home state and targeting states are two separate states (extraterritorial sanctions)
in which case, the targeting state could be targeting a company in another home state. So, the
targeting state could be both acting extraterritorially and acting transnationally. This distinction is
of great importance in order to understand what the nature of the relationship is. The question from
the human rights perspective is whether the targeting state clearly has responsibilities that are
transnational if we argue that human rights protection should be understood as extending
transnationality? Similarly, the targeting state may also have extraterritorial obligations. In the
context of extraterritorial sanctions, the possibility of passing a blocking legislation by the home
state is most likely in order to protect its own internal self-interest but also by doing that, it may
be able to act more in accordance with its own transnational human rights obligations as a home
state. In other words, the home state has certain human rights obligations; and it should consider
those obligations when it is considering becoming a targeting state. However, those obligations
may also arise when its companies are being targeted by some other state and it has an obligation
to block these, as was the case in a recent example of an EU Blocking Statute regarding US
sanctions against Iran).421
The resemblance between conflict-affected and high-risk areas and sanctioned countries
was also discussed to argue that sanctioned countries should be considered among the high-risk
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areas that also require special human rights due diligence. This would assist businesses to support
their efforts to implement the UNGPs in the context of sanctions, similar to other high-risk areas.
To sum, extraterritorial and transnational sanctions and their impacts on TNCs is an
overlooked subject in BHR that require considerable attentions by international instruments, home
states, targeting states and corporations in order to mitigate their negative impacts on human rights
and the environment.
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Chapter V: Insights from the OECD: OECD Guidance Materials for Businesses
This chapter will examine whether the business responsibility as embedded in other
guidance tools on business conduct, like the OECD MNE Guidelines, currently offer any
assistance to help companies to understand what they should do in the sanctions context.

5.1. Introduction to OECD MNE Guidelines and Guidance
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (GLs) date back to 1976, and have
been revised multiple times without including a human rights chapter up until 2011.422 In that year,
the corporate responsibility to respect human rights section was added based on the second pillar
of the UNGPs.423 These guidelines are the first international mechanism that was established by
governments to enable individuals, communities or states’ representatives “to bring complaints
against multinational corporations”.424 The OECD MNE Guidelines are regarded as
recommendations, addressed by governments to Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and encompass
“voluntary principles and standards that stimulates responsible business conduct”.425 They include
guidance on a number of areas such as bribery and corruption, human rights, environment, and
other areas none of which contains any reference to sanctions.
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In 1984, in order to contribute to the solutions for the possible problems in complying with
the guidelines, National Contact Points (NCPs), which are basically a complaints mechanism, were
established within each government.426 As of today, a total of 47 NCPs support the effective
implementation of the MNE Guidelines, promote them and also offer “their good offices to help
resolve disputes that arise within the ambit of the guidelines”.427
The 2011 OECD MNE Guidelines contains another central segment borrowed from
UNGPs and that is a system stipulation that companies need to put in place “in order to meet their
responsibility to respect human rights, centering on human rights due diligence processes.”428 This
change has expanded the guidelines coverage over most of the multinational enterprises and
extended the due diligence requirements to their business relationships.429
The legal status of the state duty under MNE Guidelines and NCPs has been a central issue
since their inception. Some consider the guidelines to be merely morally binding and they believe
that attempts must be made to move away from such status.430 On the other hand, some consider
their legal status to be more compelling as they are partly grounded in international law.431
Robinson, is among those who dispute the OECD Guidelines as being soft.432He argues
that states promote MNE Guidelines to companies as voluntary instruments, but states are
mandated to promote them as voluntary. As to the background of this issue, he explains that the
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MNE Guidelines used to be considered as not legally binding commitments, being of a voluntary
nature for states and corporations.433 However, by virtue of the OECD Council’s decision of the
Council on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the relationship between OECD
member states and the MNE Guidelines regime has fundamentally been altered.434 The
establishment and operation of a NCP is the core obligation imposed upon OECD member states.
As explained earlier, NCP is a dispute resolution mechanism “for the handling of complaints
submitted to it concerning corporations operating from or within their respective jurisdiction”.435
The above mentioned Council decision on the MNE Guidelines is legally binding on all
OECD members according to Article 5 of the OECD Charter that considers OECD Council’s
decisions binding on all members.436 Thus, according to the 2000 Council decision, the state parties
have to set up a NCP implementation mechanism within their domestic system in order to promote
the MNE Guidelines and also to help resolve issues that arise under the guidelines.437 The fact that
the Council decision on the MNE Guidelines holds OECD members accountable with regard to
their international obligations, clarifies what proper NCP administration is and that states must
refrain from considering NCPs “merely inspirational” or that they can just be “progressively
realized”.438 Given this, the National Contact Point dispute resolution mechanism with its
mandatory implementation nature, could be viewed as “a unique method for addressing corporate
misconduct”.439

433

Ibid, at 69 para 1. Also see Nicola Bonucci, “The Legal Status of an OECD Act and the Procedure for its adoption”,
(OECD, Legal Status of an OECD act 2004), online:<http://www.oecd.org/education/skills-beyondschool/31691605.pdf>.
434
See OECD, ‘Decision of the Council on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, (OECD Decision C
(2000)96/FINAL as amended by OECD Decision C/MIN (2011)11/FINAL, 27 June 2000).
435
Robinson, supra note 432, at 69 para1.
436
See OECD ‘Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’ (14 December 1960, entered into
force 30 September 1961) art 5.
437
Robinson, supra note 432, at 70-71.
438
Ibid at 80, para 1.
439
Ibid at 71 para 5.

89

This unique legal status of the OECD MNE Guidelines is of great importance. The
important question in the context of sanctions regimes is whether the OECD MNE Guidelines
offer any assistance to businesses in order to understand sanctions or not. If they do, then they are
legally binding on member states and this might help bridge the governance gap in the sanction
context. To find a relevant answer to this question, I will investigate the new “OECD Due
Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct (Guidance)” in order to realize whether
coercive measures have received any consideration or not.

5.1.1. OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct
In order to provide practical support to enterprises on the implementation of the OECD
MNE Guidelines, the first draft of this guidance was developed in May 2016 and was approved on
April 2018 by the OECD Working Party on Responsible Business conduct and the OECD
Investment Committee.440 Similar to the UNGPs as well as the ILO Tripartite Declaration of
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy441 that contain due diligence
recommendations, this guidance could assist enterprises by promoting a common “understanding
among governments and stakeholders on due diligence for responsible business conduct”.442
With regard to how corporations will manage the impacts of their activities, the Due
Diligence Guidance has been built around 6 core process expectations that expects companies to
“Embed responsible business conduct into policies and management systems”, ”Identify and
assess actual and potential adverse impacts associated with the enterprise’s operations, products
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or services”, Cease, prevent and mitigate adverse impacts”, “Track implementation and results”,
“Communicate how impacts are addressed”, “Provide for or cooperate in remediation when
appropriate”.443 Each process expectation entails detailed suggestions as to “practical actions that
companies may choose to undertake in order to align their activities with OECD Guidelines”.444
As was the case with the UNGPs, there is no reference as to what companies are expected to do in
the sanctions context and how they could deliver due diligence in such situation.
However, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (“the Guidance”),445 that is a collaborative
government-backed multi-stakeholder initiative on responsible supply chain management of
minerals from conflict affected areas, provides multiple references to the operation of companies
where UN sanctions are in place. The objective of these set of Guidelines is “to help companies
respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral sourcing
practices”.446
For example, in defining due diligence and its necessity, the Guidance explains that due
diligence will help a company to comply with international and domestic laws “including those
governing the illicit trade in minerals and United Nations sanctions”.447 This is called risk-based
due diligence and refers to steps that could mitigate or prevent potential risks that could cause
harm to people or legal liability for the company. This is why identifying factual circumstances
and evaluating facts against relevant standards provided under national and international law is of
great importance.
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What seems to be confusing is that economic sanctions, unilateral sanctions and sanctions
with an extra-jurisdictional nature, even those that are basically not in conflict with international
law (e.g. UNSC sanctions), are considered to be preventive and could lead to corporations either
seizing or terminating their operations.448 While, in fact, the sanctions would lead to violations of
international human rights law in the target state. So, in reality the priority in conducting due
diligence is to stay away from a situation where legal liability may be imposed on companies and
causing harm to civilians is of much less importance which is basically in contrast with the OECD
Due Diligence Guidance tools.
As explained, throughout the guidelines it is declared that businesses should “commit to
comply with relevant UN sanctions resolutions or, where applicable, domestic laws implementing
such resolutions.”449 Also, the Guidelines emphasizes the importance of “know your counterparty”
due diligence in order to ensure that “the trade in grandfathered stocks is not carried out in violation
of international sanctions or does not enable money-laundering resulting from … the sale of gold
reserves in conflict affected and high-risk areas”.450 Given this, companies are asked to regularly
check government watchlist information that includes the UN sanctions list – but not unilateral
economic sanctions - to ensure their operations are in line with international law.451
This, also is explained in the “Recommendation of the Council on OECD Legal
Instruments Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from ConflictAffected and High-Risk Areas” where they say acknowledge their commitment “to refraining
from any action which contributes to the financing of conflict and we commit to comply with
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relevant United Nations sanctions resolutions or, where applicable, domestic laws implementing
such resolutions.”452
To conclude, the guidelines only state that companies must comply with the UN sanctions
and they do not mention unilateral sanctions and their collateral damages at all. Similarly, the
OECD guidelines do not differentiate between home-state sanctions and others and they do not
provide any guidance for situation in which economic sanctions indirectly violate human rights by
preventing companies from operating or trading with the target sate. Consequently, to cover the
existing gap in the laws and regulations and the company’s compliance in the context of sanctions,
the differentiation between the UN sanctions and the unilateral sanctions as well as an elaborations
on company’s responsibilities in the sanction context could be considered enlightening and helpful
in order to better implementation of the responsibility to respect principle.

5.2. OECD Approaches to Conflict-affected Areas and Supply Chains
The purpose of this section is to consider the OECD guidance tools for businesses that
focus on conflict-affected areas and related human rights due diligence guidance to address human
rights issues in supply chains. Other instruments such as OECD Due Diligence Guidance for
Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas453 and its
Supplement on Gold and the UN Global Compact Guidance on Responsible Business in ConflictAffected and High-Risk Areas454 also highlight the heightened risk for corporations operate in
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such context.455 Conflict affected areas are known to requires special due diligence processes that
would help the businesses to support their efforts to implement the UNGPs. It could be argued that
sanctioned countries are also among the high-risk areas that also require special due diligence on
business and state end.
In a report on the recommendation of the Council on due diligence guidance for responsible
supply chains of minerals from conflict affected and high risk areas, there is a reference to several
UNSC Resolutions in the context of DRC456 and Cote d’Ivoire457 that call for “due diligence in
mineral supply chains to avoid financing sanctioned entities and illegal armed groups”. 458 These
resolutions, are the first and only UNSC Chapter VII Resolutions in history to reference and
support work of the OECD, understanding the value of guidance as a tool that can support peace
and security.459 The same strategy was followed through endorsement and support for responsible
mineral sourcing and Guidance by EU Commissioners in the EU’s CSR and raw materials
strategies, as well as in the introduction of the EU initiative on responsible mineral supply
chains.460
As explained in the previous section, this point is also reiterated in the OECD Model
Supply Chain Policy for a Responsible Global Supply Chain of Minerals From Conflict-Affected
and high Risk Areas461 by committing to refrain from “any action which contributes to the
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financing of conflict” and also by committing “to comply with relevant United Nations sanctions
resolutions or , where applicable, domestic laws implementing such resolutions”.462 In this regard,
the OECD Due Diligence Guidance provides detailed recommendations to help corporations
respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral purchasing decisions
and practices, especially for any company that is potentially sourcing minerals or metals from
conflict affected and high-risk areas. In order to do so, they have provided corporations with a list
of sanctions - including US, UN and EU sanctions - in order to identify blacklisted companies and
individuals.463
All these measures are taken to ensure business entities will not get involved with any
sanctioned country without paying attention to the devastating impacts of these restrictions on the
economy, life and environment of targeted states. This shows how international instruments are
merely focused on keeping TNCs away from trouble without considering the impacts on people in
the target state. This is not a fair equation and the rights of the individuals and entities connected
to sanctioned country must be equally respected and be considered by establishing norms and laws
that include guidance on business and human rights in the context of sanctions.

5.3. OECD Treaty Approach
While the OECD has taken a soft law responsible guidance approach in the human rights
context, it is important to note that in other areas it has adopted a hard law approach including the
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adoption of a treaty. For example, the OECD Bribery Convention was adopted in 1997 and came
into force in 1999 following Canada’s ratification.464
The OECD Convention aims to stop the flow of bribes and to remove bribery as a nontariff barrier to trade, producing a level playing field in international business through establishing
“legally binding standards to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials in international
business transactions”.465 In 2009, an OECD recommendation was adopted in order to further the
combatting of bribery of foreign officials in international business transactions; the purpose of the
recommendation was to establish new measures to reinforce parties efforts “to prevent, detect and
investigate foreign bribery”.466
The OECD Bribery Convention is modelled on the “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act”
(FCPA).467 The FCPA, is considered to be a great example to prove the importance of unilateral
regulation as a “necessary first step to multilateral agreement” that could later “come to be an
accepted international policy goal”.468 As Seck explains, in order to “more aggressively address
foreign bribery”, the FCPA was amended in 1998 to assert “jurisdiction over foreign nationals
where a nexus exists between activity within the territory of the US and the furtherance of a
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violation of the statute”.469 Seck highlights the assistance of the FCPA to enforcing “the national
anti-corruption laws of foreign countries in furtherance of international policy goals”.470
In order to address international bribery, the OECD bribery convention requires states “to
aggressively assert both territorial and nationality jurisdiction”.471 Modelled on the OECD antibribery Convention, UN adopted the Convention Against Corruption in 2003.472 The question
arises as to whether a treaty in the area of BHR might be useful.

5.3.1. The Working Group on BHR and The Zero Draft Treaty Initiative
We discussed the soft law approach which was followed by the OECD treaty approach in
the previous section, to better realizing the distinguished impacts of such distinction.473 In
international relations, soft law has always been considered a beneficial solution to practical
problems.474 It is even suggested that soft law norms could be more efficient than hard law in
coping with delicate issue of international arena which might result in extraterritoriality
disputes.475 However, legitimizing extraterritorial application of national laws is still disputed. It
is proposed that if two states endorse a particular soft law instrument, and the national law that is
being extraterritorially applied reflects those soft law norms, then the second state cannot object
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to this application of national laws.476 Nonetheless, it is unclear whether this is also the case where
just one state endorses the soft law norm or where the national law partly reflects the international
soft law.477
Nevertheless, it used to be the case that compliance with soft law was different from
compliance with treaties or customary international law and the legally binding effect of treaties
and customary international law has always been considered the main difference between them
and soft law.478 But if soft law has no binding effect, why does international human rights
constantly use it in international standard setting? Dinah Shelton differentiates between declaratory
or preliminary soft law and secondary soft law. She argues the latter is “the ultimate expression on
a legal question” and in this way, the content of international obligations is shaped by the
interaction of soft law with hard law. She argues that “soft law formulates and reformulates the
hard law of human rights treaties in the application of this law to specific states and cases”.479
In recent years, more often than ever before, the negative impacts of business activities on
human rights has been a reasonable reason to regulate their conducts mostly through soft law
mechanisms, both to prevent and monitor corporate rights violations and to clarify the state duty
to protect.480 Justine Nolan believes that soft law can result in incremental changes but she argues
in order for the soft law to become the “more effective and sustainable rights protection
mechanism”, a more intimate connection to hard law is required.481
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Perhaps similar conflicting ideas regarding the importance of soft law has contributed to
establishing a draft treaty on Business and Human Rights law. But it did not happen until 2014,
following OHCHR collaboration with the Working Group on Business and Human Rights, in order
to accomplish its mandate.482 In 2014, an open-ended intergovernmental working group on
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights was
established under resolution A/HRC/RES/26/9483, with a mandate “to elaborate an international
legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of
transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”484
In July 2018, the working group released the first official draft of the legally binding
instrument that is known as Zero Draft. Zero Draft consisted of 15 articles, covering different
issues. While some critical and fundamental issues are covered by Zero Draft, none of the articles,
however, cover the issue of sanctions (whether UN sanctions, economic sanctions or unilateral
sanctions). Whereas some provisions of the Zero Draft Treaty focus on imposing criminal
sanctions on companies, no reference has been made to transnational or extraterritorial sanctions.
For example, Article 10 highlights the legal liability of transnational corporations for violations of
human rights and that such liability may be subject to “effective, proportionate, and dissuasive
criminal and non-criminal sanctions”.
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Many TNCs and states are struggling with sanctions as current prominent issue of
international law without having any guideline or reference as to how protect and respect human
rights in sanctions contexts. Given this and in a world where states resort to economic war as a
form of modern confrontation, the subject of coercive measures must be taken into deliberation in
such an important draft treaty in BHR.
In a joint business response to the Zero Draft treaty, it is argued that the draft and its
optional protocol “incorporate inconsistent provisions that would greatly undermine countries’
development opportunities and they would create a lopsided global governance system that would
result in significant gaps in human rights protection”.485 Likewise, as stated, I believe the treaty
fails to cover the issue of sanctions regimes and even though it covers a wide range of issues mostly already addressed by other BHR instruments like UNGPs and OECD MNE- they do not
make a helpful contribution to the field of BHR in the context of sanctions. Due to the complex
human rights issues that has proven to arise from the operation of TNCs in target states, addressing
the subject of sanctions and providing businesses with credible and workable solutions is of great
priority and importance.
It should be mentioned that on 16 July 2019, a revised version of the BHR draft treaty was
released that is considered to be more coherent and better constructed with compare to the zero
draft.486 Nevertheless, the revised draft also falls short of covering the issue of sanctions. The
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continuous negligence regarding the troubling, devastating and vital issue of sanctions in the
context of BHR proves the draft is not yet sufficiently comprehensive and this subject should be
addressed during the process of the negotiations.

5.4. Conclusion
In this Chapter, I investigated the OECD guidance materials to discover whether sanctions
have received any considerations or not. I then considered the OECD anti-bribery treaty, and the
BHR treaty initiative.
The BHR response to impose special duties on states could either take a treaty approach or
a soft law approach. In the anti-corruption context, there is the OECD Convention, and subsequent
to that there is a UN Convention in which states have committed to passing laws to address a
problem with impacts in other countries. But if we look in the responsible business conduct,
including the OECD MNE guidelines, what states are required to do is to promote soft guidance
that is implemented through the OECD NCP mechanism. If the BHR instruments addressed the
governance gap in the context of sanctions, even though they are soft law, states would have an
obligation to promote them to prevent the negative human rights impacts of transnational and
extraterritorial sanctions.
The BHR draft (Zero Draft) also doesn’t provide any reference to unilateral economic
sanctions that violate human rights, and this is where the governance gap in the existing
international instrument becomes much clearer! On the other hand, businesses could also be seen
as having independent responsibilities under the UNGPs and international law (direct obligations
of MNEs), and so even if the home state is not regulating to prevent harms arising from sanctions,
it could be argued that the corporation has a responsibility to respect human rights and that this
would mean something different in the context of sanctions. Nevertheless, as concluded in the
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previous chapter on the UNGPs, unilateral and multilateral sanctions and their influence on TNCs
is an overlooked issue in BHR materials and innocent civilians and the environment are paying for
the current governance gap, not the states that are conducting the wrongful acts.
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Chapter VI Iran: Business and Human Rights in the Context of Sanctions
6.1. Introduction
Having been targeted with more than 32 different sets of sanctions by the US, the EU and
the UN between 1979-2012, Iran could be considered one of the world’s most sanctioned
countries.487 While the UNSC (Chapter VII sanctions), and the EU are each responsible for just 4
rounds of these sanctions against Iran, the remaining are economic sanctions imposed unilaterally
by the US. The main purpose of imposition of sanctions -whether comprehensive or unilateral
economic sanctions- is to change the target state’s behavior in the international arena and to force
it to comply with the international law and set rules. In the case of Iran, the main purpose of the
sanctions regimes has been stopping the country’s nuclear program after the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) in its 2005 report concluded that “Iran’s nuclear program had not complied
with its safeguard agreement”.488
At least the last two presidents of the US have boasted of the severity of the sanctions
against Iran and their devastating impacts on Iran’s economy.489 The undeniable damages that
sanctions have caused the Iranian economy by the dramatic drop in oil export and the consequent
collapse in the value of Iranian currency has been the focus of many studies in recent years.490
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Some empirical analysis has been conducted in order to contribute to both academic and policy
debates on the merits of sanctions against Iran.491 However, some of this research is unreliable
since the unintended (and intended) consequences of sanctions on human rights of individuals
residing in or associated with the sanctioned country are completely ignored. Furthermore, even
the UNSC sanctions regime, as discussed earlier in this thesis (Chapter 2 and 3), contributes to the
violation of human rights in the targeted state, and so contradicts the UN’s role as a human rights
safeguard.
The purpose of this chapter is not to examine the issue of illegitimacy of sanctions even
with regard to a state with wrongful acts like Iran.492 Instead, my focus will remain on the impacts
of sanctions on the operation of TNCs in a sanctioned country such as Iran. Therefore, I will
investigate how business enterprises can respect human rights and how home states can deliver on
their duty to protect human rights in the context of sanctions against Iran. To achieve this purpose,
first, I will provide a brief history of the imposition of multilateral and UCM against Iran, and their
impacts and consequences for the country. This will be followed by drawing upon UNSR reports
and recommendations to mitigate the negative impacts of sanctions, and Iranians responses to
being the constant target of multilateral and unilateral sanctions. I will then consider the impacts
of these measures on TNCs and the role of home state and the targeting state, which will be
followed by investigating the Business Responsibility to Respect Human Rights in the context of
sanctions in Iran.
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6.2. A Brief History of the Imposition of Sanctions Against Iran
6.2.1 Unilateral Sanctions: US
The history of sanctions against Iran dates as far back as 1979.493 This is when the Islamic
revolution happened and Iran, once one of the most significant US allies during the Pahlavi era,
entered into a diplomatic rupture with the US, after some revolutionaries held US embassy
employees hostages in Tehran.494 The hostage crisis is considered as a benchmark for the
sanctions. Since then, US governments have instituted vast sanctions in an effort to change Iran’s
behaviour.495 This is apart from the sanctions approved by the EU and the UN against Iran.
1980s US sanctions were mostly set up to “compel Iran to cease supporting acts of
terrorism” and to “limit Iran’s strategic power in the middle east” more generally.496 Whereas in
1990s, limiting the scope of Iran’s Nuclear program was the main focus of sanctions. Most of these
coercive measures targeted Iran’s key energy sector (oil and gas) and also its access to the
international financial system.497
Several other executive orders including E.O. 13224 (sanctioning Terrorism-supporting
entities and also Ban on US Trade and investment with Iran), 13382 (among others, any foreign
bank that is determined to have trade relationship with National Iranian Oil and Gas Company is
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banned from opening a US based account) , 13599 (impose sanctions on Central Bank and any
other state owned entity in Iran) were issued to “direct the blockings of assets of Iranian entities.498

6.2.2. Multilateral Sanctions: UN Sanctions
The UN multilateral sanctions against Iran are considered to be a rather recent development
(Post-2006), when the Iranian Nuclear enrichment issue was considered to fall within the remit of
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.499 Thus, among others, resolutions 1737(2006), 1747(2007),
1803(2008), and 1929(2010) were issued by UNSC and imposed multiple mostly targeted
sanctions against those that allegedly were engaged in the Iranian nuclear enrichment program and
arms embargo.500 This happened when after more than three years, IAEA was unable to confirm
that Iran was not engaging in undisclosed nuclear activity and did not hold undeclared nuclear
materials.501 As a result, the IAEA demanded Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities or
face economic and diplomatic sanctions, if it failed to do so.502
The first of the seven UNSC resolutions, resolution 1696, which ordered Iran to suspend
all its uranium enrichment activities, was issued on the assumption that “Iran has an intention to
make nuclear weapon”.503 It is considered to be “the cornerstone of the international sanctions
regime Iran” and subsequent resolutions followed the same assumption.504 However, according
to some scholars, the authority of the UNSC to order suspension of uranium enrichment is

498

Ibid at 656 para 4. (This information can also be found on page 4 of the 2019 updated version, mentioned above).
Alexander Orakhelashvili, “The Impact of Unilateral EU Economic Sanctions on the UN Collective Security
Framework: The Case of Iran and Syria” in Ali Z. Marrosi & Marisa R. Bassett (eds), Economic Sanctions Under
International Law (The Hague, Netherlands: Asser Press, 2015)3, at 4, para 3
500
Ibid. Seven UNSC Resolutions were issued between 2006 and 2011, but the four Resolutions that are mentioned
instituted new sanctions regimes against Iran.
501
Ibid at 9.
502
Nakanishi, supra note 494, at 29 para 4. See UN Security Council, Resolution 1696 (2006) Non-proliferation, 31
July 2006, UN Doc S/RES/1696 (2006).
503
Nakanishi, ibid, at 30 para 3.
504
Ibid.
499

106

questionable.505 As Nakanishi explains, the UNSC has acted as if it is the superior of IAEA while
in fact monitoring the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the IAEA’S
mandate, and in this case, “UNSC overrode the NPT regime”.506

6.2.3. European Union Sanctions
EU sanctions against Iran began by operating on “the premise of parallelism” between the EU
and the UN.507 EU coercive measures were initiated following the sanctions policy embodied in
UNSC Resolution 1737(2006) in order to give effect to that resolution by adopting Council
Common Position 2007/140/CFSP.508 The Council Common Position prohibited EU countries
from, among others, directly or indirectly the supply, sale or transfer of many items including
equipment, goods, technology and software to Iran.509
In 2010 through resolution 1737, however, the EU introduced additional new restrictive
measures against Iran with regard to trade between EU states and Iran that went beyond the
measures taken by UNSC resolutions.510 The emphasis on an overall restricted trade and economic
relations between the EU and Iran then become the focal point of the later EU Council decisions
to the extent that under Article 1 of the decision 012/35/CFSP member states are prohibited from
entering into financial commitments with Iran:
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“Member States shall not enter into any new short-, medium- or long-term commitments
to provide financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits,
guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade.”511
The authority of a regional Organization such as the EU in adopting coercive measures
against other states in a situation where the UNSC is already involved by taking coercive measures
under Chapter IIV is questionable.512 However, some suggest that this EU policy is premised on
authorities that would support the imposition of sanctions independently even without a UN
resolution.513 For example, in a statement the European Council suggests that autonomous
sanctions adopted by the EU are beyond the ones imposed by the UNSC to urge the Iranian
government to “engage constructively, negotiate seriously and address the concerns of the
international community” with regard to its Nuclear program.514

6.3. JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actions)
After years of being subject of unilateral and multilateral sanctions, finally in November 2013,
Iran and the P5+1 (the US , the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) met in
Geneva and signed the Joint Plan of Action that spells out the steps that Iran must take in exchange
for receiving limited sanctions relief. Those measures included halting enrichment of uranium to
20 percent and providing the IAEA access to monitoring Iranian Nuclear sites.515 The Sanction
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relief also included lifting the threat of sanctions by the US, on foreign companies dealing with
Iran’s auto sector or purchasing Iranian petrochemicals.516
After IAEA confirmation of Iran’s compliance with the terms of JPOA, in July 2015 Iran
and the P5+1 signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)517, a deal under which Iran
agreed to take every measure to curb its nuclear program in return for a significant easing of US,
UN and EU sanctions. This agreement was then formally adopted by the UNSC and Resolution
2231 was unanimously passed.518 This resolution endorsed the nuclear deal and the lifting of the
UNSC nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. Ever since adopting this resolution, the IAEA has
regularly verified that Iran has been complying with this agreement and its commitments are met.
The nuclear-related sanctions on Iran were waived until November 5, 2018 when the US
left the nuclear deal and re-imposed the UCM to deny Iran’s access to oil revenue.519 Due to this,
more than 100 corporations have exited the Iranian market and more than 70 financial institutions
with links to Iran have been sanctioned by the US.520 The Trump administration has indicated that
it takes pride in this “maximum pressure campaign” which “designat[es] over 970 Iranian entities
and individuals in more than 26 rounds of sanctions - more than any other Administration in US
history.”521
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6.3.1. The Impacts of UCM on Iran in the Context of the JCPOA
In his many reports, the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive
Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights has identified an increasing and systematic trend in
using UCM as a foreign policy tool by certain countries. In his August 2018 report, he provided
rather extensive information regarding recent developments related to the impacts of the UCM,
specifically the re-imposition of the comprehensive embargo by US on Iran.522
US termination of its participation in the JCPOA on May 2018 and subsequent reimposition of previously lifted “drastic, comprehensive unilateral sanctions regime”, had the
Special Rapporteur questioning the lawfulness of US withdrawal from such "multilateral
agreement enumerating a series of reciprocal commitments of the parties” under international
law.523 He considered this withdrawal a breach or violation of the JCPOA since this agreement is
“covered by the fundamental rule of international law pacta sunt servanda, as acknowledged by
several participants” and is endorsed by the UNSC in resolution 2231(2015).524
He then called upon all other member states, regional and also international organizations
to take required actions in order to support implementation of the JCPOA, based on UN Charter
Article 25 that obligates states to accept and carry out the decisions of the UNSC. To make his
point clear, Special Rapporteur also referred to one International Court of Justice Advisory
Opinion that affirms member states must comply with UNSC’s decision adopted under article 25
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of the UN Charter: “when the Security Council adopts a decision under Article 25 in accordance
with the Charter, it is for member States to comply with that decision. ... To hold otherwise would
be to deprive this principal organ of its essential functions and powers under the Charter.” 525

6.3.1.1. Intended Consequences of the UCM on Iran:
The ultimate intention of the US by re-establishing the comprehensive trade embargo in
2018, has been declared to be harming Iran through “unprecedented financial pressure”.526 To
achieve this objective, the US officials demand companies not to do business in or with Iran so
that the economic isolation would finally change Iran’s behavior regardless of the adverse effect
of the sanctions on ordinary people and third parties.527 The Special Rapporteur describes this
threat of “adverse consequences for corporations also doing business in the United States” as a
significant step backward.528
As argued in earlier chapters of the thesis, the implications of such sanctions could be as
catastrophic as a wartime blockade except for the fact that “the imperatives of necessity,
proportionality and discrimination” corresponding to international protection under international
humanitarian law will be disregarded in peace time blockades.529 The Special Rapporteur further
aligns “the combination of comprehensive unilateral coercive measures and of the imposition of

525

Ibid at para 32. Also see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep
16. at 53.
526
Louis Nelson, “Pompeo Threatens Iran with the Strongest Sanctions in History” Politico (05 May 2018)
online:<https://www.politico.eu/article/mike-pompeo-threatens-iran-with-strongest-sanctions-in-history/>.
527
UN Doc A/HRC/39/54, supra note 522, at para 33. US officials argue that “IRGC’s penetration in the Iranian
economy and Iran’s behavior in the region” is the reason for this economy isolations. E.g. see Katzman 2019, supra
note 560 at 18 & 30.
528
UN Doc A/HRC/39/54, ibid, at para 34.
529
Ibid at paras 34 & 18. The Special Rapporteur refers to “the catastrophic consequences for human rights of broad
trade embargoes imposed under the authority of the United Nations in the 1990s, especially with respect to Iraq that
caused a shift away from comprehensive sanctions to so-called smart sanctions.

111

secondary sanctions on third parties unrelated to the dispute” to a peacetime blockade.530 He also
highlights the general understanding surrounding extraterritorial sanctions and their unlawful
nature that “disregard commonly accepted rules governing the jurisdiction of States under
international law”.531 The Special Rapporteur also considers the recent example of application of
such wide-scale secondary sanctions to third parties not concerned with the dispute, as a violation
of the international law.532

6.3.1.2. Recommendations of The Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impacts of the
UCM on the Enjoyment of Human Rights
The objective of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur is “to promote the rule of law to
the international community with a view to eliminating economic coercion as a tool of
international diplomacy”.533 Consequently, he has regularly stressed the importance of “renewal
of the work of the International Law Commission on extraterritorial jurisdiction that was initiated
in 2006” to “elaborate on the legal status and consequences of sanctions involving the unlawful
assertion of jurisdiction by a source State or group of States over target States and a fortiori on
third States”.534
Appointing one or more representatives to restrain and ultimately abolish the use of UCM
and ensuring that sanctions exclusively be applied through the UNSC in accordance with Chapter
VII of the UN Charter are among the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur. Eventually,
adopting a draft Declaration on UCM and the rule of law and establishing an international
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consensus on the use of the UCM are his final conclusions in his latest report to the Human Rights
Council.535
The Special Rapporteur indicates that upon the transition period and sanctions termination,
a number of universally accepted rules of behaviors must be applied.536 Firstly, mitigating the
harmful consequences of UCM upon their total removal or termination is of great importance.537
Secondly, the transitional period (the period between renunciation of sanctions use and their
removal) should be shortened to the greatest extend possible. Also, targeting states must conduct
a transparent human rights impact assessment before sanction are applied during the transition
period and monitor the effects of the implementations of the sanctions.538 An effective mechanism
at the national level in order to prevent human rights violations must be considered as well.539

6.3.2. EU’s Response to UCM: Blocking Statute
The impacts of unilateral sanctions on third parties cause many obstacles for TNCs as well.
As mentioned, extraterritorial or secondary sanctions are “domestic sanctions that one State
requires other State(s) to also enforce against a targeted State” and their chilling effect on
international businesses has been extensively discussed by the Special Rapporteur.540 The risk of
being exposed to onerous penalties by the targeting state, leads to the devastating practice of “overcompliance by third parties” as a result of their unwillingness to entertain relations with the
targeted state.541 Thus, it is more likely that additional adverse consequences for human rights arise
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by extraterritorial application of unilateral sanctions in comparison to other multilateral or
unilateral international sanctions.542
To fight against the imposition of UCM, in November 1996, the EU adopted regulation
No. 2271/96 in response to US implemented restrictive measures concerning Cuba, Lybia and
Iran.543 The US unilateral measures against aforementioned countries, negatively affected the
interests of natural and legal persons in the EU engaging in business with those countries. Thus,
when the US left the JCPOA, the European Commission launched a process to expand the scope
of this regulation on May 2018 by adding to it the extraterritorial measures taken by US against
Iran, in order to mitigate “the impact of these sanctions on EU operators doing legitimate business
in and with Iran”.544 This regulation will provide protection against the extraterritorial application
of the sanctions where they negatively affect “the interests of persons… engaging in international
trade and /or the movement of capital and related commercial activities between the Community
and third countries”545. As a result of which, individuals and entities are not to comply with any
requirement or prohibition resulting from the sanctions according to article 11 of the Council
regulation No. 2271/96. Likewise, judgments or decision of courts or tribunal located outside the
community giving effect to the sanctions is not enforceable.546
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However, as Special Rapporteur explains, this legislation is seemingly underutilized in
practice since “the strategic importance of continued access to the US market for most affected
European Union businesses” make the TNCs unwilling to risk continuing or initiating their
business with the sanctioned country.547 Thus, the protection granted under this instrument has
remained to a large extent theoretical.548 Nevertheless, many European countries including
Germany, Austria and France have expressed a principled rejection of the threats of extraterritorial
measures and have considered them illegal under international law on different occasions.549

6.3.3. Iran’s Response to Sanctions
Iran has responded to the sanctions in its official communications at the UN level and has
expressed its main concerns with regard to UCM. For instance, in 2014 in response to a
questionnaire prepared in line with Human Rights Council Resolution 24/14550, Iran mentioned
that by negatively affecting the multilateral trading system, UCM have caused extensive human
rights violations, including that of civil, political, economic, social and cultural nature, as well as
the right to development.551 They based their argument on the illegality of such measures according
to UN Charter and the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, that obliges states to
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“refrain from any unilateral measure not in accordance with international law and the
charter of the UN that creates obstacles to trade relations among states and impedes the full
realization of the human rights set forth in the universal declaration of human rights and
international human rights instruments”552.
Furthermore, amongst others, representatives of Iran to the UN reiterated how the principle
of non-discrimination and non-interference in internal affairs of the members of the UN, as
enshrined in its Charter, is undermined (UNDHR art. 3; ICCPR art. 6, para. 1; UDHR art. 25,
para1; ICESCR art.11). Their response also emphasized the adverse effects of coercive measures
on the job market, and rights governed by Article 6 of the ICESCR.553 They also discussed that
the primary victims of these measures in Iran are often the most vulnerable classes including
women, children, the infirm and older persons as well as the poor. In questions concerning the
adverse impacts of sanctions on citizens in non-targeted third states, Iran highlighted the
extraterritorial effects of “trade sanctions, embargoes, boycotts and the interruption of financial
flows” that is extended to third parties.554
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As a constant target of sanctions, Iran considers the current mechanisms of the UN
ineffective and incapable in curbing the inhumane consequences of the UCM on the civilian
population. They insist on a more specific and effective assessment mechanism at the UN and the
Human Rights Council to ultimately prevent imposition or maintaining of UCM and proposed
establishment of an independent body under the General Assembly to “consider the issue in depth
from the perspective of human rights, security and the rule of law”.555 They also suggested a
monitoring mechanism within the UN “to examine the legality of security Council sanctions which
are issued and maintained based on chapter seven”.556 Also, the right of the victims to reparation
must be guaranteed by establishment of a mechanism.
Based on responses provided by Iran, other states, inter-governmental organizations and
national human rights institutions to this questionnaire that was prepared in line with HRC
Resolution 24/14, a progress report (A/HRC/28/74) was finalized and submitted to the council.557
The progress report contains a number of well-documented case studies, which include Cuba,
Zimbabwe, Iran and Gaza strip, in order to highlight the foremost adverse effects of UCM on the
enjoyment of human rights in target and non-targeted states.

6.3.4. Section Conclusion
To sum up, based on what we discussed in this part and the previous chapters of the thesis,
whereas even the UNSC sanctions are problematic and so may create BHR issues, the imposition
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of UCM are even more problematic when they are imposed in violation of existing UN sanctions
and so violates international law.
One way in which UCM are problematic is by applying to third states (extraterritorially)
and attempts to block their applications (such as the EU Blocking Statute) are not effective. This
creates many BHR issues (see previous chapter and the section below for BHR issues in the context
of sanctions against Iran). But even if they are not applied to third parties, their transnational
application can still create BHR issues. Nevertheless, BHR issues are worse and more complex
when their unilateral application is to third parties (extraterritorially).
The responsibility for the arisen BHR issues in the context of sanctions (mostly unilateral
but also multilateral) cannot be determined because of the governance gap in the existing
international instruments. Nevertheless, as argued before, the human rights protection should be
understood as extending transnationally and extraterritorially (UNGPs, Principles 1&2). In other
words, the home state and the targeting state have respectively transnational and extraterritorial
responsibilities from the human rights perspective. Businesses in turn, must be understood as
having direct and independent obligations under international law instruments and the UNGPs.
Thus, in the context of the sanctions against Iran, even if the targeting state (US) or the home state
fails to protect BHR issues arising from the imposition of sanctions, a direct responsibility to
respect human rights can be attributed to the TNCs. This can mitigate the negative impacts of the
coercive measures on target state in general, and civilians and third parties in particular. Having
this conclusion in mind, the section bellow will discuss the BHR applications in the context of
sanctions against Iran, in more detail.
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6.4. Business and Human Rights in Iran
Iran is a country with substantial oil reserves and potential for fast growth. Signing the
JCPOA in 2015 and receiving sanctions relief led to investment of many TNCs in the Iranian
market. Many of these corporations were western companies including automakers such as
Daimler and Peugeot, locomotives maker such as Siemens and, France’s Total to explore offshore
natural gas.558 Nevertheless, even though some TNCs such as General Electric and Boeing “lined
up orders”, other American corporations such as Chevron and Exxon Mobile were still “effectively
blocked” by US sanctions.559 The European based corporations didn’t face the same restriction
because of the sanction relief granted by the JCPOA.
After US departure of the JCPOA and despite EU’s efforts, the serious pressure imposed
by the US as well as companies fear to face penalties and secondary sanctions, led to TNCs
departure to comply with the US sanctions.560 The lack of enforcement and effectiveness of the
blocking legislation by the European Corporations is noticeable in the context of UCM against
Iran.561
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Many major (non-US) TNCs operating in oil and gas industry to car manufacturers and
consumer goods firms concluded that “the challenges of doing business in Iran overcome the
potential business opportunities they see there”.562 Among those are Boeing, Airbus, General
Electric, German state-owned rail operator Deutsche Bahn and French Oil firm Total that has
exited a nearly $5 billion energy investment in South Pars gas field.563

6.4.1. Home State Duty to Protect in Iran: Scenarios
It was extensively discussed in the previous chapter that, as one of the fundamental pillars
of the UNGPs identified by the Special Representative to the UN Secretary General on Business
and Human Rights, the state duty to protect is not territorially limited, and under the international
legal system, the exercise of transnational obligations is not subject to any legal constraints.564 The
state duty to protect also requires states to prevent third parties from interfering with the enjoyment
of human rights. Likewise, this duty obligates home states to ensure their national companies do
not infringe human rights in other countries in which they operate (host states).565 Home-state
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domestic measures with transnational application, perhaps is the best way to ensure duty to protect
is carried out effectively.566 This enable states to efficiently regulate the human rights standards of
their TNCs. The adoption of the new law in France in 2017 to implement the duty to protect
principle is the best example for a practical approach towards this issue. 567 This law that is based
on the UNGPs, imposes a “duty of care” as it sets “an obligation of vigilance” on French
companies.568 Such measures will improve corporate respect for human rights and the environment
by creating legally binding obligation for parent companies to “identify and prevent human rights
abuses and damages to the environment resulting not only from their own activities but also from
that of companies that they directly or indirectly control as well as activities of the subcontractors
and suppliers with which they have an established commercial relationship both in France and in
the world”.569 The established obligation of prudent and diligent conduct requires companies to
submit an annual vigilance plan and an implementation report of this plan.570
However, the effectiveness and implementation of such domestic laws by major
corporations is contested. An assessment report published by the Government of France in June
2019 shows that Total’s vigilance report is too vague, with a fairly weak risk mapping which is
not applied to the actual activities and countries in which the company operates.571
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As mentioned, French companies like Total and Renault are among TNCs which invested
in the Iranian market post-JCPOA. Yet, irrespective of their obligation of vigilance established
under their domestic laws, and the consequent direct and indirect outcomes on human rights and
the environment, they left the Iranian market regardless of the negative impacts their exit left on
the country. Nevertheless, given that domestic laws and regulations are unclear as to what legal
risks companies may face and what economic sanctions means for them, providing businesses with
more details and instruction could improve their performance in sanctions context. Thus, having
such laws and regulations at the national level is just the first step and the implementation is just
as important. And perhaps as stated before, an international binding treaty that comprehensively
covers the issue of sanctions could better hold companies accountable for their actions.
In the context of sanctions, enhanced due diligence must be carried out to ensure business
activities in sanctioned countries will not contribute or facilitate human rights abuses. Earlier in
the thesis, it was argued that sanctioned states should be among the high-risk areas and UNGPs
recognize the heightened risk of violating human rights in conflict-affected and high-risk areas.
Even though the UNGPs do not refer to coercive measures and do not propose any specific
definition for conflict-affected and high-risk areas, the Geneva Academy developed a number of
criteria and indicators to identify such areas.572 Among others, areas with “widespread and serious
human rights violations” and “political/social instability or repression”573 can be considered a
high-risk and conflict -affected zone. The previous chapters of the thesis extensively discussed the
negative and disastrous impacts of sanctions on target states and it can be argued that both these
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two indicators match the situation of sanctioned country. As a result, the importance of due
diligence is the context of sanctions to fully implement UNGPs must be taken into account.
Imposing unilateral sanctions is a violation of international law. Yet, powerful states such
as US maintain this habit to reach to their desired policies and objectives. Nevertheless, the
classification of target states like Iran as conflict-affected areas can and should change the way in
which the US determines whether or not and how to impose sanctions; Perhaps, considering
effective channels that can facilitate protecting economic, social and cultural rights of the
individuals and entities within or in association with the target state, and the environment, can be
a decent first step by the US to meet its obligation of promoting and protecting the enjoyment and
full realization of all human rights by all people under international law.

6.4.2. Business Responsibility to Respect Human Rights in Iran
“The international Campaign for Human Rights in Iran” launched the “Iran Business
Responsibility Project” (IBR) in June 2017.574 This non-profit initiative encourages and guides
companies to act responsibly when doing business in Iran. The IBR aims to “foster business
practices that respect people and the environment, enhancing the benefits business can bring and
reducing risks for companies”.575 To achieve this purpose, the organization works closely and
collaboratively with companies, governments and other stakeholders. The work of IBR is of great
importance since existence of an entity that would facilitate adherence to international responsible
business standards sounds quite necessary.
The organization promotes responsible business conduct through several measures.
According to their mandate, they provide “in-depth expertise on business conditions and practices
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in Iran”, and in order to avoid adverse impacts on individuals and the environment, they engage
with stakeholders to “catalyst discussion, identify salient issues, and share good practices”.576
Furthermore, to ensure corporations are not being involved in harmful impacts, they provide
guidance on “specific measures and strategies companies can take in the Iranian context”.577
So far, IBR has carried out multiple sessions and workshops with companies, industrial
associations, export credit agencies, financial institutions, multilateral development organizations
and also governments. Almost in all their briefings, the importance of an ongoing due diligence
process for responsible business to avoid and mitigate negative impacts on people and the
environment is highlighted. However, the first step of such due diligence process that is
“identifying actual and potential adverse impacts from any business activity” is rather challenging
due to difficulties in obtaining the necessary information to identify and assess such impacts.578
In one of their latest report, published on November 2018, they investigated the impact of
the current political landscape -including the return of US-imposed unilateral economic sanctionson foreign investment in Iran. As mentioned, after the return of economic sanctions, many
corporations decided to exit the country while some small to medium-sized enterprises maintained
their investment in Iran. This prompt exit has caused many challenges for corporations (mainly
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TNCs) as to what international responsible business standards implies. Thus, due to these
numerous issues, the IBR provided some suggestions based on company practice to address the
challenges that exit poses in Iran.579 They stress that responsibly exiting the sanctioned state’s
market is of great importance and companies should identify, mitigate or remediate the potential
adverse impact on people and the environment of their exit.580 Apart from the major economic
impacts, leaving Iran could have potential impacts on workers employed by the company, on other
stakeholders and also potential environmental and social impacts “related to handing over the
project or business to companies with lower internal standards”.581 To tackle these serious issues,
companies can provide support for impacted workers to mitigate the impact of severance. They
also should regularly communicate with relevant stakeholders to ensure timely closure. Also, by
employing social and environmental expertise identifying potential social and environmental
impact of leaving they could plan a safe exit strategy.582 In geographies like Iran, where there may
be “uncertainty regarding the company’s ability to do business long-term in the market, planning
for a responsible exit is part of a responsible entry into the market”.583
According to international normative standards such as the UNGPs and also the OECD
MNE Guidelines, business responsibility to respect human rights entails a corporation’s
responsibility for the adverse impacts of business activities on people and the environment.
According to these instruments, corporations can contribute to adverse human rights impacts
through three types of involvements: they can either cause an adverse impact through their own

579

Iran Business Responsibility, “Conducting Responsible Business in Iran: Beyond Sanctions: Managing Risks from
Business
Relationships
in
Iran”,
Practice
Note,
November
2018,
online:<https://ibrproject.org/practicenote/files/IBR_Practice_Note_Report.pdf?x60674>.
580
Iran Business Responsibility, “Special Issue: Responsible Exit”, Briefings, June 2018,
online:<https://ibrproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/briefing-6-en.pdf> , at1.
581
Ibid at 2.
582
Ibid at 3.
583
Ibid at 4.

125

activity or contribute to adverse impact. Or, a company can be “directly linked to an adverse impact
through their operations, products or services via business relationships”. This indicates that “the
scope of company responsibility is broad” and it also shows that even indirect and even remote
adverse human rights impacts is included in business responsibility.584 But there is also the issue
of climate change and its link to sanctions; for instance, the National Iranian Oil Company is one
of top carbon majors. But how can Iran transition its economy to renewable energy when it is
constantly under sanctions? As a transboundary issue, climate change is threatening the whole
world and sanctions are directly contributing to it.

6.5. Conclusion
Sanctions are considered to be “economic in purpose” yet “political in intent”.585 An issue
as such that is politically charged, often creates substantial legal, operational and financial risks
for corporations, through imposing unjust regulatory and compliance requirements. The
undeniable and disastrous impacts of coercive measures on economy and industry have been
confirmed by many studies and reports.586 The studies refer to the wide range of sanctions and
measures, that have been established thorough UNSC, regional and national authorities, relating
to the nuclear, missile, energy, shipping, transportation and financial sectors of Iran, by different
countries.587 Imposition of both multilateral and unilateral sanctions on Iran has caused major

584

Ibid, Annex 2.
Neil Hodge, “Dealing with US Sanctions on Iran”, International Bar Association (29 November 2018), online: <
www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=8E695B89-2B89-4681-A5AE-11C92B7EF008>.
586
See UN Human Rights Council, UN Doc A/HRC/28/74 (10 February 2015) Research-based progress report of
the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee containing recommendations on mechanisms to assess the negative
impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights and to promote accountability, also see
International Civil Society Network, “What the Women Say: Killing Them Softly: the Stark Impact of Sanctions on
the Lives of Ordinary Iranians”, Brief 3, July 2012.
587
In particular, depriving Iran of SWIFT services has made international payments to Western companies almost
impossible. See International Crisis Group, supra note 20 at 34 & 52.
585

126

issues, and even though the US and the EU claim “that the sanctions do not apply to humanitarian
items”, in actual fact they have major impacts on e.g. delivery and availability of medical supplies
that often leads to the death of the patient, because of complications to perform financial
transactions due to blockades.588
In order to discuss the BHR in Iran, it is important to analyse the impact of coercive
measures (mostly economic sanctions) on foreign business entities and laws and regulation that
influence these foreign relations. The many embargoes that have been placed on Iran or the many
TNCs that are barred from doing business with Iran, certainly must be considered before
investigating BHR in Iran. Even though the sanction relief for a short time after setting up JCPOA
brought about economic growth, various restrictions still remain in place that are of greatly
destructive. Iran has a considerable natural and human resources and doing business with a country
with these characteristics, could definitely be mutually beneficial for both Iran and international
enterprises. Whether or not it is still possible to enter into business relationship with Iran despite
the current sanctions’ regimes, does not sound that likely given the fact that the risks of such
business relation overweigh its advantages, given the penalties corporations will encounter by the
US.
All in all, after investigating the home state duty to protect and business responsibility to
respect in the context of a sanctioned country like Iran, perhaps the best way to curb the negative
impacts of sanctions on BHR is modelling on the 2017 French law and establishment of the
obligation of care, prudent and diligent conduct with transnational applicational. Naturally, an
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effective implementation of such laws could mitigate the impacts of extraterritorial sanctions on
BHR of the target state. Likewise, the targeting state’s extraterritorial human rights obligations
should not be overlooked. In case both home state and the targeting state fail to protect BHR, based
on UNGPs, businesses have direct obligations to respect human rights. All this being said, in the
context of sanctions, evidently politics and power prevails over international law!

128

Chapter VII Conclusion
In recent years, many academics and politicians are inclined to refer to sanctions as tools
of “economic warfare” rather than tools of “foreign policy”.589 The widespread use of sanctions is
not limited to the multilateral level (UN); Regional (in particular, EU) and unilateral imposition of
sanctions has also been practiced widely. There has also been a drastic change in the nature of the
imposed measures: “Comprehensive” sanctions have mostly turned to “targeted” or “smart”
sanctions that encompass asset freezes or travel bans with regard to individuals and prohibit
particular activities such as arm embargoes and export bans when directed at entities.590
The continuing challenges and criticisms encountered by the imposition of sanctions, have
not been limited to certain type of UNSC sanctions or the UCM. Sanctions’ legal basis and their
conformity with international law has always been contested. The UNSC, for example, imposes
sanctions based on undisclosed evidence and no judicial review is available for those measures.
Furthermore, the entities and individuals subject to the UN sanctions are said to be reduced to
“conditions of indigency”.591 Thus, even though UN Charter VII authorizes the imposition of
sanctions, the process of such measures is deeply criticized. Similarly, unilateral sanctions and
their extraterritorial application are not only unlawful, but also violate the rights of the sanctioned
state including their sovereign rights.
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Perhaps as discussed earlier in the thesis, the prominent problem with the economic
sanctions, in particular, is the lack of a universally accepted mechanism or an authoritative
international body in international law to investigate the lawfulness of these types of sanctions
specially when they are derived from a unilateral act of a state.592 Additionally, in most cases, the
collateral damages they leave on innocent civilians, the environment and third parties are costly,
long-lasting and irreversible. In other words, as “means of political and economic coercion against
developing countries”,they not only target vulnerable economies, but also the burden of the
sanctions are to be bear by the most vulnerable group of people, the environment and the
uninvolved states.593 With regard to the collateral damages of the coercive measures on the
environment, in an article written by Kaveh Madani, he refers to the negative impacts of the
sanctions on the environment due to the alternative survival means targeted country has to find,
that will ultimately have devastating environmental consequences.594 The impact of sanctions on
the environment, a critical yet overlooked issue with transnational impacts beyond borders, is a
subject that must be investigated in future by academics.
The main focus of this thesis remained on BHR in the context of sanctions. In order to
answer the central question of the thesis as whether the state duty to protect human rights as found
in the international normative standards is relevant when a home state impose sanctions either
transnationally or extraterritorially on TNCs with a different home state. We also investigated
whether the corporation can comply with its responsibility to respect human rights in light of the
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sanctions. To answer these questions, we examined BHR international normative standards such
as UNGPs and OECD MNEs Guidelines to realize whether coercive measures have received any
consideration.
This thesis identified a considerable gap in international law materials covering BHR in
the context of sanctions. Unfortunately, no reference is made to the UCM or even UNSC sanctions
in BHR normative standards and those materials that discuss multilateral economic sanctions,
mostly concentrate on the compliance of businesses while the negative impacts of multilateral and
unilateral sanctions on the corporations and the resulting human rights violations is rarely
discussed.
With regard to state duty to protect and its jurisdictional scope, throughout the thesis we
distinguished between “transnational” and “extraterritorial” obligations of states. As the human
rights protections should be understood as extending transnationally, it was concluded that home
state and the targeting state have respectively transnational and extraterritorial responsibilities
from the human rights perspective grounded on UNGPs Guiding Principle 1 and Guiding Principle
2. Thus, while applying domestic regulations to corporations with different nationalities as that of
home states is extraterritorial and is not allowed under the principles of international law, states
can apply their laws transnationally to a corporate national with a branch in another state. The
recent example of France’s vigilance law imposed transnationally on all its corporation was
proposed as a good example of application of such laws.
It was also argued that given the disastrous impacts of sanctions and ineffectiveness of
exemptions provided under the sanctions regime for necessities such as food, medicine and
medical technology, categorizing the sanctioned country among the conflict-affected and high-risk
areas (as reflected in Guiding Principle 7 and Commentary to Guiding Principle 23) could mitigate
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the devastating negative impacts of sanctions through the special due diligence process required
in such complex contexts.
Chapter 4 and 5 concluded that addressing sanctions in BHR can fill in the existing
governance gap. Promoting soft guidance tools that can be promoted through OECD National
Contact Point mechanism is a good first step, given the fact that Zero Draft does not include any
reference to this issue (and it has not become a treaty yet). The unique nature of OECD mechanisms
obliges states to promote them in order to prevent the negative impacts of transnational and
extraterritorial sanctions. Also, it was recommended that given that sanctions issues aren’t closely
addressed in home state materials, maybe by allocating direct obligation for TNCs, the issue can
become less challenging. Similarly, it was concluded that in order to cover the existing gap in the
laws and regulations and the company’s compliance in the context of sanctions, the differentiation
between the UNSC sanctions and the unilateral sanctions as well as an elaborations on company’s
responsibilities in the sanction context could be considered enlightening and helpful in better
implementing the responsibility to respect principle.
We further discussed the importance of promotion of international cooperation that needs
to go hand in hand with state duty to protect as highlighted in Principle 10/c to solve this issue.
Unfortunately, the UNGPs fail to mention that factors such as the geopolitical situation of the
developing states, conflict-affected areas, or the mere presence of sanctions could diminish the
ability of states to establish an effective duty to protect.
The last chapter of the thesis examined the case of Iran and the complications arising from
exiting TNCs and resulting human rights violations and hardships inflicted upon Iranians as a
result of years of being targeted by multilateral and unilateral sanctions. The ultimate purpose of
this section of the thesis was to realize what lessons could be learned and what policy
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considerations must be taken into account in the context of sanctions and BHR in order to fill in
the governance gap in BHR materials to protect people, environment and the businesses. Studying
the case of Iran enlightened us that the lack of relevant regulations, policies and laws could cost
people violation of their basic rights. With the absence of a caring domestic government and
silence of the international law, what should people resort to?
Finally, international arena is not a one man show. All parts of the equation including the
international community, home states, the targeting states and the TNCs must cooperate to protect
human rights by filling the current gap in BHR in the context of sanctions.
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